Borrow US, Israel tool kit in war on terror

From the Al-Qaeda bombing of the US Embassy in 1998 to the recent Garissa terror attacks, many Kenyans have expressed their feelings - mostly anger and hopelessness.

Based on experience, I would like to offer a possible tool kit to help our country mitigate against terrorism.

The kit is based on international best practices by nations such as the US and Israel who have been key targets of terrorism.

For more than 50 years, during the cold war, deterrence was the cornerstone of the US strategy. The US aimed to prevent the Soviet Union from attacking the West by threatening to retaliate with devastating nuclear response.

Following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, however, the traditional concept of deterrence became irrelevant. Unlike the Soviet Union's leadership, the terrorists were irrational, willing to incur any cost including death to achieve their goals.

As a result under President George W. Bush Administration, a new National Security Strategy was released in 2001, which focused on a combination of efforts that includes economic, diplomatic, military, political and psychological deterrence.

Deterrence is a strategic interaction in which an actor prevents an adversary from taking an action the adversary otherwise would have taken. Convincing the adversary that the cost of taking that action will outweigh any potential gains.

Defensive policies are primarily designed to fend off an opponent in the event of an attack and deterrence policies are intended to convince an advisory not to attack in the first place.

Here is a component of a deterrence tool kit which I believe can work for Kenya:

Direct response strategies deter terrorists by threatening to retaliate against them by taking hostile actions or punishment strategy. For example, after the July 2005 terrorist bombing in London, Tony Blair announced his intention to pass legislation that would ban the "glorification of terrorism".

This piece of legislation deters radical clerics from preaching incendiary.

Indirect response threatens to act against something terrorists hold dear, such as family, assets and communities.

For example, Israel's past policy of demolishing homes of suicide bombers' families. This policy forced suicide bombers to trade off the benefit of personal glory and martyrdom against the cost of homelessness for their families.

They discourage terrorists by threatening to deter their ability to successfully conduct an attack.

As Osama Bin Laden himself argued, "When people see a strong horse and a weak horse they will like a strong horse". For example, if Kenya adopts the American style we will send a clear message to the terrorists that it is not in their best interest to attack.

Such a policy will have the following implications:

First, homeland security must not be designed primarily as a defence. We cannot hope to thwart every kind of conceivable attack, rather the goal should be to raise the perceivable probability that all attacks will be thwarted to convince terrorist not to attempt an attack in the first place.

Secondly, apart from its objective level of defences, Kenya can take measures to shape terrorists subjective perceptions of its counter terror capabilities.

Deterrence is a psychological relationship between the terrorist and a nation-state. If terrorists believe Kenya has the capacity to successfully thwart an attack, they might abandon their plans altogether.

Thirdly, Kenya should adopt strategic communication policies, to convince would-be terrorists that an attack is likely to fail.

For example, Kenya can publicise the extent and depth of its homeland security measures. Perhaps Kenya should put aside excessive concern with secrecy and become more willing to publicise failed attacks.

Lastly, Kenya may also be able to achieve deterrence by developing and publicising our resilience, including a thorough adequate disaster planning and emergency response system at national and county levels.

For example, the United States announced soon after September 11, that it would shoot down hijacked airplanes. If terrorists believe they will not achieve their intended objective, they will abandon the plan.

Strategic denial policies deter terrorists by threatening to deny them strategic gains. They may be deterred if they strongly believe highly successful attacks such as Westgate Shopping Mall and Garissa University will not achieve broader political goals.

A strategy of systematically denying terrorist strategic objectives begins with identifying their clear objectives such as creating a wedge between Christians and Muslims, making Kenya a lawless and ultimately a failed state, withdrawal of the KDF from Somalia, Al-Shabaab belief that in response to popular public pressure, Kenya will concede to the terrorists' political demands.

Lastly, create a homeland security integrated plan that would bring together KDF, the police, the National Intelligence Service, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 47 counties as part of the security apparatus.

Also devolve part of the national security administration units such as Administration Police and the local Anti-terror police units to be directly under the governors.