Only a third force will avert return to bloody conflict in South Sudan

South Sudan President Salva Kiir (centre) holds hands with new First Vice President Taban Deng Gai (left) and Second Vice President James Wani Igga inside the Presidential Palace in Juba. [Photo: Reuters]

South Sudan First Vice President Riek Machar, fled Juba at the height of renewed conflict between forces loyal to him and those loyal to President Salva Kiir. Dr Machar had returned to Juba in early 2016 to take up his former post as First Vice President following the signing of a peace deal between him and Kiir in August 2015.

The departure of Dr Machar was prompted by the government’s failure to assure his and his officials’ security. The new development has thrown the diplomatic community into a spin as it threatens the 11-months old accord. The UN has warned that South Sudan could slide back into an all-out conflict, more so if the appointment of Dr Machar’s replacement violates the terms of the accord.

A section of senior leaders of the SPLA–IO, sensing an opportunity to sideline their boss likely with the backing of President Kiir, met and appointed Mining Minister Taban Deng Gai to replace Machar as leader of SPLA–IO and therefore as First Vice President, in a “temporary” capacity.

The appointment of Deng was promptly “reversed” by Machar in a letter in which he also accused Deng of defecting to the SPLA faction headed by Kiir. But Deng is no newcomer to public office or controversy. A longtime comrade of Dr Machar before they fell out, the former Chevron Executive served as one of the SPLA Commanders during the long drawn conflict which eventually led to secession of the south from the north. He served as governor of Unity State from 2005 until 2013 when he was sacked by President Kiir for allegedly supporting Machar’s presidential ambitions.

The acting First Vice President, however, pales in stature compared to the steely, polished and highly influential Machar. The latter carries the hopes and aspirations of the Nuer ethnic group, the second largest by population in South Sudan and enjoys the support of most commanders. He switched sides many times during the North-South conflict, at one time signing a peace accord with President Omar al-Bashir and being appointed the President’s assistant.

He rejoined the John Garang-led SPLA in 2002 and served as Vice President of the autonomous South Sudan after the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. He demonstrated his enormous influence by retaining the post in 2011 after the South Sudan independence. But in 2013, President Kiir dismissed him from the position of First Vice President on accusations of plotting a coup against him. The conflict which followed was brutal and claimed the lives of tens of thousands of people, displaced some two million and exposed millions others to biting food shortages.

It would be convenient to dismiss Machar as a controversial and divisive figure. It is easy to replace him with a pliable figure such as Deng and hope that the peace agreement holds. But the reality on the ground makes that possibility quite remote. Machar is revered among his Nuer ethnic group. It is difficult to see how he can be replaced as their leader. As a matter of fact, being away from the centre of power puts the fluid unity between the Nuer and the Dinka majority into great risk.

It is against this background that the UN Secretary General pointed out that the appointment of Deng had violated the Peace Accord and warned that the country could return to full scale violence. However, the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC), which is overseeing the implementation of the peace deal, was cautious in its approach, emphasising its impartiality in response to the latest developments. Its chairman Festus Mogae said the commission’s primary interest was a solution that promotes peace and a return to normalcy.

Those supporting Dr Machar’s replacement argue that President Kiir acted within the law in light of Article 6.4 of the August 2015 peace accord. The clause in question states that “in the event that the post of the First Vice President falls vacant during the Transitional Period, for any reason, including mental infirmity or physical incapacity of the office holder, the replacement shall be nominated by the top leadership body of the South Sudan Armed Opposition as at the signing of this Agreement.”

However, critics argue that Article 6.5 which states that “in the event of temporary absence of the First Vice President, the First Vice President may delegate a senior South Sudan Armed Opposition Minister to carry out functions and duties as stipulated in this Agreement” does not foresee a situation where President Kiir appoints a replacement during the transition. Only Machar can delegate his duties to a senior person of his choice.

The letter and spirit of the law aside, the overriding goal right now should be on making decisions that promote the best interest of all South Sudanese people. Millions of innocent citizens remain displaced within their own country while others live as refugees in other countries. These people have gone through hell and will be reluctant to return to their homes in the current environment. Food shortages will continue to bite and frustrations will make people vulnerable to manipulation by the various rebel groups operating in the country.

Fundamentally, the reconstruction efforts will stall and the peace deal itself may not hold. Foreign nations with interests in South Sudan are also worried about the possibility of renewed conflict in the resource-rich country. There have been reports of Uganda losing an estimated US$1 million daily since the conflict resumed. Then there are countries such as China with major mining and exploration operations in the region. It goes without saying that some powerful nations and groups back various factions associated with either Kiir or Machar to prop up their business interests. But it is unlikely that continued instability and ethnic infighting would serve their long term goals.

In fact, the disagreements over the peace accord aren’t just about Machar and Kiir. South Sudan is in the hands of powerful cartels mainly associated with the ruling elite. They control virtually every sector of the fledgling nation’s economy and their fear is that strict implementation of the peace accord, especially with Machar’s larger than life presence in the corridors of power, could expose their illicit activities and cut short the life of some deals entered irregularly. To succeed at their game, the powerful elite have resorted to divide and rule tactics to weaken Machar and eventually cripple him. It is through this prism that Deng’s appointment is to be viewed.

Machar on the other hand is determined to squeeze a favourable deal for himself, his supporters and his Nuer ethnic group. It is evident that he will not accept any position that disadvantages him and his people as that would weaken his own base as a leader. If his past actions are anything to go by, he would most likely choose to fight for a better deal from the bush than accept a raw deal from the comfort of Juba.

The AU and IGAD’s proposal to send in a third force to create a buffer between Kiir’s and Machar’s forces has been rejected by Kiir but welcomed by Machar. It is a deal which is still on the table and if successful, might see Machar return to Juba and implementation of the peace deal resume.

If this option fails, the entire country might be plunged into a conflict far worse than the 2013 one in which tens of thousands of people died. Machar’s forces remain heavily armed and could be enjoying the tacit support of foreign parties who are unhappy with Kiir’s foreign policy agenda.

There is also the unlikely possibility that some of Machar’s previous backers may change tack and cast their lot with the government side. There is currently no indication that this could come to pass but were it to happen, then Machar could be exposed and forced into exile.

The best way forward to salvage an inevitable return to war lies not inside South Sudan. Unfortunately, given the poisoned environment, the solution lies with South Sudan’s neighbours and the international community. The AU, IGAD and the UN must put pressure on both sides to the conflict to live up to the peace deal they signed in August 2015. Since the two men do not trust each other, a third force comprising the AU and the UN must be accepted and remain in place throughout the transition period. Fundamentally, the political and electoral systems must be reformed to allow for a level playing ground in future elections. As long as the system is seen to be favouring one side to the exclusion of a significant segment of the population, South Sudan will not know peace.

This is not a time to sit back and watch as the situation unfolds. It is the best time to actively engage all parties to the conflict with the aim of striking a deal that works for the long suffering people of South Sudan.

- The writer is the chief communications adviser at the Africa Centre for Strategic Futures: Kenya Project.