Transmitting results electronically is also fraught with grave risks

 

 

Comprehensive Technical Electoral Strategy (CTES) draws a number of application levels, which are an expression of the most vital keystones of legitimacy of an election that is driven by public confidence in the resulting structures of democratic governance. These factors largely depend on the actual and perceived integrity of the electoral process – that must be acceptable by all parties involved.

Unless I am wrong, Kenya for instance, lacks an Electoral Integrity Portfolio (EIP) with key principles that can technologically identify technology-enabled fraud, systemic malpractice and create resolutions to them. Neither does Kenyan electoral commission (IEBC) have technological support systems, which can by terms of immediacy effectively and fairly investigate and arbitration processes that are run by external players like an independent network service providers.

The fact that IEBC is contracting private companies (Safaricom, Airtel and Telkom) to provide network on which Results Transmission System (RTS) will operate, should by itself cause players to interrogate the safety-nets therein. RTS has been developed to help in transmitting provisional results electronically to observation centres and to the National Tallying Centre (NTC).

At the end of voting, and when votes have been counted and tallied, the Presiding Officers (POs) will enter the data on the signed results sheet (Form 35) into a specially configured mobile phone and transmits the results simultaneous to the election results centres at the constituency, county and National Tallying Centre.

Three levels

Electronic results transmission will be done at three levels of digital communication:

First, specially configured phones – on which Presiding Officers will enter text of provisional results, then send this text on the assigned network; secondly, reponderant network - Safaricom, Airtel or Telkom network – which is a grid setup that will carry the text or image, and deliver it to the telecommunication infrastructure of the service provider.

At this point, the text may be configured or directly routed to point to a designated server or designated devices; third, IEBC RTS Infrastructure – which will decode this message and automatically tally the results in correspondence to the numbers of votes garnered by the various candidates.

In the context of technological argument, the most important question would be; what is the possibility that an individual or a company colluding with a political player to manipulate results? My answer is yes, there is a possibility.

Even without delving so much into details on how this mischief would be done, it is important to remind ourselves of some events that took place in the last election. Alleged phone call conversation between former IEBC CEO, James Oswago and unnamed person within ODM circles revealed that the Government ensured that a member of National Intelligence Security (NIS) got employed in the IT Department of the commission prior to 2013 polls. As alleged, this is the person who was responsible for manipulation of electoral results on transmission. It is not clear whether this story was true or false.

‘Inside-job’ is the best way for ensuring that sinister tasks are accomplished within an electoral system since the person will be able to conduct such operations without any struggle.

The person can as well install unidentified malwares that can discreetly fetch or manipulate data from preponderant network infrastructure, and transfer it to a designated server. Some of these actions can be done without IEBC Commissioners’ knowledge.

In fact, a technological tool like a High Dimensional Analytics (HDA) is capable of running a designated database that reflects that of IEBC – in terms of number of registered voters per polling station – across the country. When properly ascribed as a computer worming algorithmic calculation pattern, under Round Robbing Algorithm, HDA can systematically replace results from specific polling centres or regions with predetermined results. All these can be done on the preponderant network infrastructure.

What is more, electronic electoral malpractices can be done on the Register of Voters, Database and Results Transmission System. IEBC should tell us how they will guard against such technological malpractices that can be conducted away from their jurisdiction.

Mr Asuelaa is an Online Editor at The Standard