Kenya must urgently confront rising political radicalisation

 Ballot boxes at Ruaraka constituency tallying centre, Stima Club, Nairobi, on August 11, 2022 [File, Standard]

Kenya is often praised for its success in countering violent extremism and terrorism, a global threat that has destabilised many states. Yet beneath this achievement lies a quieter but equally dangerous danger: The resurgence of ethnic and political radicalisation ahead of the 2027 General Election.

Early signs suggest that political actors are deliberately mobilising supporters, raising the risk of election-related violence. If this trend is left unchecked, the country could once again face instability reminiscent of the 2007 post-election crisis that claimed lives and destroyed livelihoods.

The November 2025 by-elections in Kasipul, Mbeere North and Malava constituencies offered a troubling preview of what may lie ahead. Rather than isolated disruptions, the mini-polls appeared to function as a testing ground for political machinery. Reports of intimidation, violence, hooliganism and blatant electoral malpractice were widespread.

Leaders from both government and opposition camps were implicated, raising serious concerns about political commitment to democratic norms. These events underscored the growing entrenchment of “goon culture” in Kenyan politics, where criminal gangs are deployed to intimidate rivals and manipulate electoral outcomes.

Media investigations and public discourse increasingly point to an underground economy of political violence. Young men, often unemployed and vulnerable, are reportedly hired for as little as Sh500 per assignment to disrupt rallies, intimidate voters, or interfere with voting processes. In moments of chaos, some supplement this income through theft and robbery. A recent television documentary laid bare how this shadow economy thrives during election periods, eroding public trust and staining Kenya’s democratic credentials.

Social media has become a powerful accelerant in this cycle of radicalisation. Political mobilisation often laced with ethnic and inflammatory messaging is increasingly conducted online, with youth as the primary targets. This pattern has intensified since the Gen Z-led protests of June 2024, which initially demanded accountability and reform. While those protests reflected genuine civic engagement, they were later infiltrated by political interests seeking to redirect youthful energy toward partisan ends.

As the 2027 elections draw closer and political rhetoric sharpens, dormant criminal gangs have re-emerged, sensing opportunity. Some politicians appear to maintain informal control over these groups during campaign periods, exploiting joblessness and social frustration for personal gain. The misuse of unemployed youth as instruments of violence is not only unethical but dangerously shortsighted, carrying long-term consequences for national security and social cohesion.

Allowing perpetrators of electoral violence to operate with impunity sets a deeply damaging precedent. Electoral violence directly violates Article 81(e) of the Constitution, which guarantees elections free from violence, intimidation, improper influence and corruption. A country that prides itself on a progressive constitution cannot afford to normalise political violence.

Kenya’s Vision 2030 further reinforces this obligation by envisioning a democratic, people-centered and issue-based political system grounded in accountability and inclusivity. The legal and policy frameworks needed to prevent politically instigated violence already exist; what remains is inconsistent enforcement. Strengthening adherence to electoral laws, compelling politicians to honour peace charters, and holding offenders accountable are critical steps toward dismantling the culture of impunity.

Youth empowerment must also be central to this effort. While unemployment continues to expose young people to exploitation, violence is not an inevitable outcome. The government remains proactive in both creating jobs locally and abroad, as well as ensuring youth access to capital for starting businesses or boosting existing ones. Government initiatives such as the Hustler Fund and the National Youth Opportunities Towards Advancement (NYOTA) programme offer pathways to income generation and entrepreneurship. Expanding access to such opportunities and ensuring transparency and inclusivity in their implementation can reduce the appeal of political violence as a survival strategy.

Failure to act carries risks beyond election cycles. Politically radicalised youth may drift into more sophisticated criminal networks once campaigns end, or become vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups such as Al Shabaab. Preventing this trajectory requires early intervention, sustained civic education and collaboration between state and non-state actors.

Mr. Zidia is a security analyst