Iran has legal authority to manage the Strait of Hormuz

Smoke rises from the site of an Israeli strike on the outskirts of the southern Lebanese village of Choukine, on April 9, 2026.[AFP]

For generations, maritime navigation through the Strait of Hormuz relied not upon rigid legal dictates, but upon a foundation of mutual good faith and comity. The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a primary coastal State, has long facilitated the peaceful passage of vessels. However, this history of cooperation was never an abdication of our sovereign rights.

Today, a fundamental shift in regional circumstances driven by persistent aggression and security threats has rendered the previous unilateral approach untenable. The time has come to recalibrate our maritime framework to ensure the security of our nation and the stability of the waterway. Measures have been taken with a view to preventing further risks from being imposed on vessels and seafarers in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman.

The security landscape of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz has been profoundly undermined by repeated acts of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The involvement of the United States, the Zionist regime, and certain neighbouring states that facilitate these hostile acts of aggression has turned the Strait into a theatre of instability. According to General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX), providing territory for such aggression constitutes complicity.

This behaviour violates the United Nations Charter and the peremptory norm prohibiting aggression. Consequently, the “security vacuum” created by these threats makes the continued application of old, permissive regimes dangerous and unsustainable.

It is imperative to understand that international maritime law does not operate in a vacuum. It must be interpreted alongside the highest principles of international law, including the prohibition of the threat or use of force, as enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. As established by the International Court of Justice in cases such as Nicaragua v. United States, foreign military actions that endanger the sovereignty or security of a coastal State are fundamentally contrary to international law. Established international judicial precedents, such as the Corfu Channel and Oil Platforms cases, underscore that no right of passage can be exercised in a manner that threatens the security or sovereignty of a coastal State.

International conventions do not authorise the stationing of foreign forces in a coastal state's territorial sea. This affirms Iran’s right, supported by the San Remo Manual, to restrict such presence to preserve regional neutrality and safeguard the waterway.

Iran and Oman maintain historic sovereignty over the Strait, a status recognised by legal precedent and centuries of continuous exercise. As the International Court of Justice noted in Qatar v. Bahrain, such historic titles are valid bases for maritime rights. Our current measures, including the regulation of military vessels and the protection of our maritime public order, are not just domestic policy; they are necessary exercises of these foundational rights.

Legal analysis must respect a clear hierarchy. At the apex are peremptory norms (jus cogens), such as the prohibition of aggression, like Article 2(4) of the UN-Charter. Next comes international humanitarian law, and only then specialised bodies like the law of the sea. Treating the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as an isolated, supreme framework, while ignoring the root causes of regional instability, is a fundamentally flawed approach. In other words, the law of the sea must not be analysed separately from the “root causes” that have shaped the current situation, including aggression, continuous military threats, and the inability of the Security Council to maintain peace.

Iran is not a party to the UNCLOS. Iran maintains its position as a "persistent objector" to the "transit passage" regime articulated in that convention. Through consistent legislative and diplomatic actions, including its 1993 Law on Maritime Zones, Iran has rejected the binding nature of these specific provisions. Additionally, the regime of “transit passage” outlined in the 1982 convention does not meet the established criteria of customary international law.

Therefore, in the absence of a binding treaty obligation and in the absence of a customary rule of “transit passage”, the governing framework of the Strait of Hormuz remains the customary right of “innocent passage.”

Under this framework, Iran possesses the legal authority to regulate passage, collect fees for maritime services, require prior authorisation for warships, and take all necessary measures to defend its national security. The measures taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran are consistent with this customary framework.

In conclusion, Iran is not seeking conflict; we are seeking order. By establishing a balance between the security requirements of the coastal State and the safe passage of international vessels, we are adapting to a new reality to ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains a zone of stability, rather than a conduit for international wrongdoing.