Will the Jubilee Party go the way of Kanu?

The impending formation of the Jubilee Party is an interesting development. The party will serve as an important mechanism of alleviating the commitment problem built into the 2022 UhuRuto pact.

William Ruto understands that without a strong party in Uhuru Kenyatta’s second term, it will be hard for the latter to deliver on his promise of backing him come 2022. By tying the political fortunes of allied politicians to those of the president and his deputy, the Jubilee Party will minimise the risk of these elites reneging on the the UhuRuto pact. But what does the history of political parties tell us about the likelihood of the Jubilee Party surviving past 2022? To start with, we need to consider what keeps political parties alive. First, parties need a ready made political bloc. The geographic concentration of ethnic groups and the legacy of colonial-era district parties have made ethnic groups the natural nuclei of most parties. This is not to say that all parties in Kenya’s history have been ethnic in character. The Social Democratic Party, the original Kanu, among others, are examples of parties that were formed at least in part around ideas and specific pan-ethnic goals. Second, parties need material resources. To this end, parties thrive when they have a steady flow of financial resources – either from the public coffers (when in power) or through a wealthy benefactor.

A third factor that drives political party life in Kenya is the personalities of the founding leaders. Since most parties tend to be formed as special purpose vehicles (SPVs) targeting specific electoral objectives of specific individuals, many rarely survive a change in leadership. For example, after the original Kanu was wrestled from the grip of Oginga Odinga, Bildad Kaggiah, and other leftists, it was allowed to die a slow death (As Martin Shikuku readily pointed out in Parliament in October 1975). Jomo Kenyatta preferred to rule using the Provincial Administration and not the party. Daniel Moi would revive the party after 1978, in part to discipline Kenyatta era administrative officials and ambitious politicians like Charles Njonjo. Kanu then became Moi’s baby, so much so that by 1986 he could claim that the party was supreme over Parliament. The personalisation of Kanu also meant that it was bound to be cast into the wilderness – as indeed happened – when Moi left office in 2002.

Another key example is the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). As currently constituted, ODM is Raila Odinga’s political SPV. It is hard to imagine the party surviving for longer once Odinga retires from active politics. A logical implication of this observation is that Raila’s retirement from politics is not totally his own decision to make. There are those around him whose political fortunes depend on the continued existence of ODM as a viable party and their close association with Raila the man. These politicians have strong incentives to keep Raila’s hopes of ascending to the highest office in the land alive and well. His presence at the top of the ticket masks these politicians’ incompetence and mediocre record of service to wananchi. Given these observations, it appears that Jubilee Party starts off in a strong position.

First, as the incumbent party its political leadership will use the bully pulpit and access to (public) financial resources to catapult it to prominence. Second, the party has a ready-made base on support among the ethnic bases of Ruto and Kenyatta.

The only question remaining is whether the party will survive the retirement of Kenyatta (if he manages to win reelection next August). A possible solution to this problem would be to grant the party leader immense powers, and then have Kenyatta stay on in this position even after he retires. That way he can remain as a symbol of party unity, while also maintaining the ability to discipline any errant members who might want to renege on the UhuRuto pact.