JSC must now break the silent bias against legal academics

The judge hammer a judge in court located on a desk.

The standard by which a judiciary is judged is the quality of its thinking. Courts go beyond resolving disputes. They also shape a nation’s constitutional morality and culture. In this regard, Kenya’s Constitution deliberately opened the gates of judicial office to more than courtroom technicians. It envisioned judges who are distinguished in law, intellect, and character. In practice, however, an unspoken bias persists, suspicion of academics as judges. This bias is neither constitutional nor intellectually defensible.

Articles 166 and 167 of the Constitution prescribe the qualifications for judges of the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court. Beyond years of legal experience, the Constitution demands a “distinguished career in law.” The current recruitment culture equates distinction with the bench experience and litigation alone, in most cases. Distinction may arise from scholarship, teaching, jurisprudential leadership, or sustained contribution to legal thought. A university professor who has spent decades interrogating constitutionalism, interpreting statutes, and shaping generations of lawyers squarely meets this threshold. To suggest otherwise is to reduce law to procedure and to strip it of its intellectual soul.