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Intrigues that shattered the Kibaki-Raila dream

President Mwai Kibaki at St Pauls High School Kevote when the school celebrated its golden jubilee. [George Mulala, Standard]

One of the first and most significant pointers to Kenyans not to expect President Kibaki to keep pre-election promises was his trashing of the MoU signed between the National Alliance of Kenya (NAK) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). As a pre-election grand coalition-building effort, NAK and LDP supported by a number of smaller parties, had agreed on both a political programme and a power-sharing formula.

They, therefore, ended up with two MoUs. One, an elaborate MoU outlining policy commitments and key principles of forming the post-Moi government, which was read out to the public at Hilton Hotel on October 2002.

The other, detailing a power-sharing arrangement for the two parties, was signed by the Summit of the hitherto presidential contenders at Nairobi Club and detailed the structure of government and how Cabinet positions would be shared by the two sides.

The Hilton document was read in the full view of Kenyans while the Nairobi Club one was read in the full view of members of the Summit in the meeting rooms of the Club and deposited with lawyer Ambrose Rachier.

The latter agreement was not made public. It is through the MoUs that the National Rainbow Coalition was born. Both documents were regarded as being part of the same deal and were collectively referred to as the MoU.

The MoU was the glue that bound the NARC coalition together and facilitated electoral victory over Kanu.

Eight slots

Some of the key provisions of the MoU were sharing positions in the government on a 50:50 basis, and creation of the position of Prime Minister, which would go to LDP. In his Cabinet of 23, Kibaki appointed 15 ministers from his NAK wing and gave LDP eight slots only. To rub salt into a gaping wound, most of the eight persons appointed from the LDP were not nominated by the party but were said to be dyed-in-the-wool NAK supporters.

Of course, the Prime Minister's position was not created. Kibaki and his allies argued that to create this position would be tantamount to establishing two centres of power, which they averred to be a recipe for instability. The greatest paradox is that it was the same individuals, including Kibaki and Murungi, who had as opposition leaders rooted for the creation of this position in order to disperse powers of what they called 'imperial presidency".

True to his reputation, it was minister John Michuki who let the cat out of the bag. As reported in The Standard of September 18, 2003, Michuki, while addressing a rally in his Central Kenya backyard, told the people that they had proposed the creation of the premiership so that "one of our own could share power with Moi". Now that Moi was gone, he reasoned, there was no need for power to be dispersed because unlike Moi, Kibaki was a good president.

Feeling betrayed by this turn of events, 25 LDP legislators led by Mbita MP Otieno Kajwang' issued a statement to declare that "unless the President honoured the MoU on appointments, the tenets on which Narc was founded will be betrayed".

In contradiction to his inaugural speech that Kenyans had interpreted and praised as spelling doom for the culture of patronage politics, cronyism, rent-seeking, kleptocracy and the Big Man syndrome as he declared that the era of one-man rule was over and the politics of roadside declarations was now past, President Kibaki cast aside the Narc Summit, a body meant to facilitate consultative governance and check one-man rule.

His new regime quickly acquired an ethnic character. This became manifest when he appointed his Cabinet and top public servants, including those in the parastatals. It was noted that he did this without consulting any of NARC's top leaders.

Instead, it was said that a cabal comprising Joe Wanjui, George Muhoho and Nat Kang'ethe had either been tasked or arrogated themselves the role of vetting top appointments for the new administration. Soon, there was disquiet even within the NAK side of the coalition, with accusations flying that the Democratic Party section had hijacked the government. Indeed, there were murmurs that GEMA had replaced KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) as power barons. It was, indeed, politics as usual.

Another pointer that the Kibaki administration was not going to midwife a departure from those the Kenyatta and Moi eras before him was the character of his key appointees. Nearly all of them had previous and not very glorious official experience with the Kanu government in critical dockets. Going by what the country had experienced under the two previous regimes, the appointments inspired little optimism.

The reform enthusiasts were alarmed that President Kibaki's first batch of permanent secretaries included six former key Kanu top movers. These included a former notorious police officer, Jeremiah Matagaro, former provincial commissioner Zachary Ogongo, former district commissioner Dave Mwangi, two former permanent secretaries Karega Mutahi and Erastus Mwongera, and a former Secretary to the Teachers Service Commission, Benjamin Sogomo.

In analysing the new appointments, we failed to discern any distinguished service this sextet and others had rendered that made their inclusion in a transformative team unavoidable. Francis Muthaura, an old hand who rose through the ranks from a district commissioner to a permanent secretary in the two preceding regimes of Jomo and Moi, was appointed to head the public service.

Through his appointment of the Cabinet, top civil servants and heads of state corporations, President Kibaki deliberately blended the Kenyatta "family" with Moi's 'extended family'. Muhoho, Kenyatta's brother-in-law, had served a long spell as Juja MP and Moi's minister for Tourism and Wildlife. Kibaki appointed him as the Managing Director and chief executive of the Kenya Airports Authority.

Michuki was a notorious administrator in the colonial era, nicknamed kimendero (crusher), because he was alleged to have specialised in crushing the genitals of Mau Mau activists. He served as a permanent secretary under Jomo and MP and assistant minister in the Moi regime. Matere Keriri was another carry-over straddling all seasons. Kibaki named him Comptroller of State House.

These initial appointments were a clear indicator to pro-reform activists of the direction President Kibaki had chosen to steer the country. It did not, therefore, surprise us when within two years: Kanu legislators were incorporated into the 'Government of National Unity'. The co-optation of Ford People's Simeon Nyachae's well as Njenga Karume and John Koech of Kanu was a clear signal that President Kibaki had indeed engaged the reverse political gear.

A casual observer would have dismissed this recycling of top Kanu influence peddlers as only an urge to satisfy nostalgia and reward members of the old boy network. Nothing could be farther from the truth. It was a deliberate scheme to forge an alliance between the Moi era wheeler-dealers and key members of the Kibaki administration.

Stronger Than Faith: My Journey in the Quest for Justice

Genre: Autography

Author: Oduor Ong'wen

Publisher: Vita Books, 2022

Copyright 2022, Oduor Ong'wen

Availability: Distributed by African Books Collective (ABC)