11 critical questions still linger after Chebukati orders suspension of IEBC ICT boss

On Tuesday, September 19th 2017, a memo from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, ordering for the firing of ICT boss James Muhati leaked to the media.

Though the IEBC Chairman Wafula Chebukati was quick to state that the leaked document was an internal issue and was still under discussion by the Commission, several questions still linger, casting doubt on whether the IEBC is really ready to conduct fresh presidential elections on the set date – October 17.

Though this seems impossible, Chebukati seems to be on the frontline of streamlining the Commission, ordering the firing of Muhati along with Paul Mugo and Bonface Wamae, ICT Coordinator and ICT official respectively.


According to an article on The Standard Muhati has been accused of creating a ‘Super User’ account under Chebukati’s name without the Chair’s knowledge, an account used to make more than 9000 transactions during the election period.

The memo read, “The chairperson, as the National Returning Officer, therefore demands the officers in the ICT directorate be immediately suspended in accordance with enabling laws and IEBC's HR and administration manual to facilitate full and proper investigations.”


In the memo, it is purported that the ICT officials failed to notice any sort of tampering with the system, leading to external manipulation of data before, during and after August 8th 2017.

French firm OT- Morpho, responsible for providing the Commission with the Kenya Integrated Elections Management System (KIEMS) has refuted claims of any external interference.

Eleven burning questions remain unanswered, even if it looks unlikely that the October 18th election will push through.

Chebukati’s burning questions:

  • Why security features were not put on statutory form 34As.
  • Whether Messer MFI supplied printing and scanning machines and if they worked on Election Day.
  • Why Sh848 million satellite phones never worked.
  • The creation of a username and password in the name of the IEBC Chairman without his consent or knowledge.
  • Why 10,366 polling stations sent text results without accompanying forms
  • Why 595 polling stations failed to send any presidential results
  • Why IEBC used an insecure server to transmit form 34Bs
  • Why Orange and Airtel were allocated KIEMS kits in areas where they did not have strong network and why Safaricom was not allocated the same despite having been contracted
  • Why KIEMS failed to give statistics on voter turnout and identification updates as it had been projected
  • Why 682 polling stations had an equal number of rejected votes vis a vis the number of registered voters in those polling stations
  • Why the KIEMS GPRS and Geo-Fencing features were switched off three days to D-Day.