When majority of citizens go hungry, national security by State is a mirage

This might sound brazen, but a government that cannot guarantee food security, cannot assure national security and would quickly lose legitimacy to govern, or would have no business claiming control of the reins of power.

This indeed must be a position largely acknowledged by democratic governments and is the reason why food security assumes a priority attention at the highest level in any government.

Food security must, therefore, constitute the heart of our national security pillars. We cannot talk of national security without assurances on food security.

Last week the Parliamentary Select Committee investigating the Cost of Living, led by Ababu Namwamba, warned of an imminent food crisis.

Hard realities

It revealed that the country presently has a strategic food maize stock reserve of 3.2 million bags held by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB)- enough to last, only, up to July. NCPB’s Managing Director also appealed to the farmers to deliver any maize holdings. What, then, are the hard realities?

First, we have a national food shortage and as usual the situation is blamed on a cycle of bad weather. This begs the question: Why have we not planned better year-in year-out given this knowledge? How can we blame the weather today, tomorrow and the day after, yet we have experience on the weather cycle?

How can we adopt a business-as-usual attitude, knowing the current food consumption and stock levels? How can we warn the country and expect both local and international speculators to be sympathetic to our cause?

What are our essential maize and wheat pricing policies?

What level of strategic reserves should we hold, based on current population level?

What should we hold in stock and foreign currency reserves for imports as a matter of last resort?

Could trading in a futures market guarantee better prices?

Surely, if, we cannot produce enough food to assure our people of food security at all times, no matter the cycle of weather, then, we would certainly be courting a national disaster and disruptive social disorder.

Why? We cannot blame the cycle of bad weather all the time and allow imports at exorbitant prices. It defeats any economic logic. Why can’t we guarantee better prices to encourage local food production, yet be prepared to pay much more for food imports? We are now accustomed to a scenario that only serves to benefit speculators and favoured commodity traders — acting in cohorts with those exercising power and influence in the food import decisions.

Secondly, the agricultural sector is our source of food, foreign exchange earnings and the largest contributor of employment, but this is a neglected sector in resource allocation.

Management of the sector requires a policy reorientation and rethink with the right people to deal with structural and multiple teething challenges.

We need a pricing regime that is sensitive to the plight of farmers and actual cost of production, risks and reasonable level of return. Farmers cannot subsidise consumers through lower prices without a return on their investments. It is unsustainable and our farmers are now becoming commercially oriented and not just producing subsistence surplus.

Thus, in order to give them incentives, NCPB should adopt a structured pricing regime that reflects early delivery and on-farm storage to minimise supply pressures.

Such a dynamic pricing regime would also encourage emergence of market specialists that will invest in storage and working capital stock to bridge the gap between supply and demand, while assuring a market to farmers.

The latter would also invest in limited on-farm storage facilities for better prices, contributing to national strategic storage capacity. Thus, a graduated pricing regime by NCPB would be attractive to farmers, with floor pricing adjusted in line with market demand, but with a reasonable return on costs of production.

Thirdly, the national investments on price stabilisation and holdings on strategic grains role delegated to NCPB need a rethink to ensure funding level and adequacy for food security.

Sufficient funding

The amount of funding depends on the level of strategic reserves desired, and quantity of market stabilisation stocks.

NCPB would require a revolving fund of at least Sh15 billion, assuming that it needs to purchase an average of eight million bags of maize with respect to market stabilisation and replenishment of half of a strategic grains reserve of six million bags.

This further assumes that at least five million bags are for market stabilisation at a fair average dynamic floor-pricing of Sh3,000 per bag. It also assumes the strategic reserves are fully funded.

However, reality suggests that NCPB’s funding is inadequate to fulfil its mandate, and the produce pricing policy regime is inappropriate and demands change and total reorientation, starting with the 2011/2012 budget proposals, this being a matter of compelling public interest!

—[email protected]