Of Africa's political economy and food systems

 

Agriculture Cabinet Secretary Mutahi Kagwe inspects a maize variety at the Kenya Seed stand during the Nakuru ASK Show on July 4, 2025. [Kipsang Joseph, Standard]

Last week, in the tea highlands of Limuru just outside Nairobi, I sat with Permanent Secretaries and senior officials from agriculture ministries across 15 African countries. Convened by AGRA, the retreat was not about drafting another strategy. It was about taking stock, honestly, of where Africa’s agricultural transformation stands nearly two decades into AGRA’s journey.

The timing could not have been more consequential. Global disruptions-from pandemics to geopolitical conflicts-have repeatedly exposed the fragility of food systems and the risks of over‑reliance on external supply chains. For Africa, these shocks have underscored a long‑standing vulnerability: despite holding some of the world’s largest reserves of arable land, the continent still imports more than USD 70 billion worth of food each year. This is not merely a trade imbalance; it is a development failure that has left value chains underbuilt, jobs unrealised, and rural economies behind.

The stakes are rising quickly. Nearly 12 million young Africans enter the labour market annually, while only about three million formal jobs are created. This widening gap is both a political and economic fault line and an opportunity hiding in plain sight. By 2030, Africa’s agrifood system is projected to be worth USD 1 trillion. With the right choices, it could become the continent’s single-largest engine of jobs, enterprise, and inclusive growth.

What emerged clearly from our discussions was not a lack of vision. Africa is rich in frameworks. The African Union’s Agenda 2063 charts an ambitious course toward shared prosperity, while the CAADP 2026–2035 Kampala Declaration provides a detailed roadmap for transforming food systems. What has been missing is execution. Political commitment has too often stopped at declarations. Investment has been episodic. Institutions have worked in silos. Accountability has been weak. Until political will translates into sustained financing, aligned institutions, and measurable delivery, even the best strategies will remain aspirational.

This is why the continent’s political calendar matters. As countries such as Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Mali approach election cycles between 2026 and 2027, a rare window has opened. Elections can be more than moments of transition; they can be turning points for national priorities. Agriculture must move from campaign rhetoric to funded, time‑bound commitments anchored in CAADP targets and credible national delivery plans.

Recent history offers stark reminders of the cost of delay. The COVID‑19 pandemic disrupted global supply chains. The Russia–Ukraine war sent shockwaves through food and fertiliser markets. Fresh disruptions linked to the Middle East are once again driving up costs. Africa imports nearly 90 per cent of its fertiliser, leaving farmers acutely exposed to global price volatility, while rising fuel prices squeeze transport and agro‑processing costs. These repeated shocks raise a hard question: how many crises must pass before Africa decisively invests in its own food sovereignty?

It was in this context that the idea of an Africa Food Corridor, explored extensively during the retreat, resonated deeply. By strengthening regional trade, improving logistics, and lowering barriers to cross‑border movement of food, Africa can better connect surplus‑producing regions to deficit markets, reduce costs, and build resilience. Renewed investments in ports and transport corridors-though often driven by access to minerals-are beginning to unlock these possibilities. The challenge now is alignment: ensuring that infrastructure serves agricultural transformation rather than bypassing it.

None of this will succeed without a new compact between governments and the private sector. As the East African Grain Council underscored, trust is the currency of investment. Where governments provide predictable policies and credible enforcement, private capital follows. Where mistrust prevails, even well‑designed reforms stall.

Data and evidence must underpin this next phase. Effective delivery depends on knowing who farmers are, where they are, and what they need. Digital platforms and farmer registries are already changing this equation. Kenya’s Integrated Agriculture Management Information System (KIAMIS), adapted from Zambia’s ZIAMIS, has registered millions of farmers and is enabling more targeted delivery of inputs, subsidies, and extension services. Its real value lies not just in efficiency, but in enabling real‑time, evidence‑based decision‑making across the sector.

Inclusion remains the final test. Women, who make up close to half of Africa’s agricultural workforce, continue to face systematic barriers to land, finance, and services that suppress productivity. Closing this gap is not charity; it is one of the fastest and most cost‑effective ways to raise yields, incomes, and food security. At the same time, Africa’s youth must see agriculture not as a fallback, but as a frontier of opportunity. Digital tools, logistics platforms, and agri‑tech innovations are opening new entry points for entrepreneurs and service providers across the value chain.

As AGRA marks 20 years, there is broad recognition that Africa has made real progress. But the next chapter will demand a different discipline-one that prizes delivery over declarations, coordination over fragmentation, and results over rhetoric. The convergence of political transitions, global disruptions, and emerging infrastructure presents a rare moment. Africa can continue to absorb external shocks and deepen its dependence on imports, or it can choose to build resilient, integrated food systems that anchor prosperity at home.

When farmers prosper, Africa prospers. The task ahead is clear: to move from promise to performance, from frameworks to function, and to make agriculture not just a sector of potential, but the true backbone of Africa’s economy.

The writer is the Director of Policy and State Capability at AGRA