Why we need to devolve police to reap from devolution

The World Bank has welcomed Kenya’s devolution as among the most ambitious in the world. That said, implementation of the model will benefit substantially if counties had their own enforcement departments staffed with officers answerable to the county governments.

The new Constitution did not devolve the police but retained it at the national government. The Constitution decrees that Governors shall be the chief executives of their respective counties. Yet, Governors have no control over policing in their counties. The Constitution also confers legislative authority over counties through County Assemblies. But what is the point of having the power to make laws without the power to enforce them?

Although there is county-level policing, officers are not county employees. Instead, the Inspector-General of Police designates in each county the seniormost officer to co-ordinate police activities. The security operations of counties are controlled by the National Government administration under the stewardship of County Commissioners, who chair security committees that only send regular briefings to the Governor. The lack of control of any form of law enforcement and ensuing reliance on national government attracts a benign form of control of county governments by the national government, especially where county leaders were sponsored by Opposition parties.

The Constitution gives power to the people to make decisions on matters affecting them. But considering the different policing needs of counties as some are prone to livestock rustling, erratic inter-community skirmishes, terrorist threats, and refugee influx, how would counties make their own decisions while they depend on the differential benevolence of the national government for police resources to effect those decisions? The Constitution apparently anticipated these variations and created an “equalisation fund” for easing out disparities in county needs. Each county has a County Policing Authority with six civilians appointed by the Governor and several other members who are ex-officio. Although the meetings of the County Policing Authorities are chaired by the Governor or the Governor’s designee, the secretary, who must be a senior police officer, is appointed by the County Police Commander, who is an appointee of the Inspector-General of Police.

Of more interest is the existence of two parallel lines of administration within counties, which confounds the pecking order. These line-ups may create considerable supremacy disputes but the law calls for the constitution of a mediation team to deal with such disputes. It is arguable that devolution is only a new phenomenon, but how will the proliferation of county-specific laws be harmonised for effective enforcement by national police? Since any police officer can be posted to any county, how will the officers acclimate themselves to the laws of the counties to which they are posted? Similarly, how will the police prioritise between enforcing national and county laws whenever resources create limitations? These issues may seem innocuous now but if unchecked, their effect may slow down delivery of services and compromise devolution.

Prof Mbuba teaches criminal justice at Purdue University Fort Wayne, USA.