Sad story of broken promises as graft and greed threaten to tear South Sudan apart

Although the conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (RSS) is one of the most pressing anywhere in the world, the narrative is not entirely unique. It is the post-independence story of many African countries which squandered opportunities to build strong nation states, thanks to greedy elite. It is the story of broken promises and of a people still waiting to reap benefits of nationhood decades after the colonial powers left.

As early as 2005 when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed and southern autonomy restored, the elite commenced the elaborate creation of networks that would control virtually all sectors of the economy. Corruption and patronage began in earnest as millions of war-weary South Sudanese tried to find their place in the soon to be created state.

In early 2011, South Sudanese overwhelmingly voted for an independent state in a historic referendum after two decades of conflict in which 2.2 million people died and millions displaced. In doing so, the people sent a strong message to their leaders and the international community that they wanted to determine their own destiny.

There was hope and determination. The country, reputed to be one of Africa’s richest in terms of natural resources, held a lot of promise. Those living in exile, those displaced within the country as well as those living as refugees in neighbouring countries, looked forward to returning home to help in rebuilding their country.

The world responded with corresponding goodwill. Up to 2013, the country received billions of dollars in donor assistance enabling it to engage in public spending nearly three times larger than Kenya although its economy is only a fifth the size of its south east neighbour.

In December 2013, just five months after marking its second anniversary, war broke out after President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, accused former First Vice President Dr Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, of plotting to overthrow the government.

The president had earlier in July fired the entire Cabinet, including big names who had played critical roles during the long drawn conflict with the north. One of those fired was Dr Machar as were a host of ethnically diverse officials. Some of those fired decided to join the political opposition to resist Mr Kiir’s growing hold on power.

Kiir had commenced a process of consolidating power around his loyalists, particularly those from his home state of Warrap. Ominously, Machar and his rebel army left Juba and returned to the jungle. In the months that followed, up to 300,000 people are estimated to have been killed, more than two million displaced and about 40 per cent of the population rendered food insecure. Reconstruction projects stalled.

At the centre of the internecine warfare is the control of resources in the country, particularly the oil revenues and donor funding. The elite, many of them in government, control virtually all sectors of the economy. Corruption is rife with the country being ranked 171 out of 175 in the 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index. A lot of the money is funneled through the military (whose spending is not subject to public audit), manipulation of foreign currency regime, opaque procurement, ghost workers and money laundering, among others.

In fact in 2012, President Kiir accused 75 ministers of having stolen US$4 billion and pleaded with them to return it. However, only 1.5 per cent of the stolen money was reportedly returned and even so it wasn’t channeled into the much needed reconstruction efforts.

Reports indicate that only 10 to 20 per cent of the country’s revenue goes to the states and rural areas while the rest remains in Juba, where it is controlled by the small elite. The money is used to co-opt armed groups in a bid to weaken the rebel base, consolidate the ruling elite’s hold on power and fund patronage networks.

The conflict seems designed to force a renegotiation of power by the elite associated with Machar who feel left out of the kleptocratic regime. Machar, an influential figure within the SPLA-IO, is also keen to effect reforms in the state architecture that would allow him to run for and win the highest office in the land. His previous efforts to unseat President Kiir through the electoral process have not borne fruit. The ambitions of the two men are at loggerheads with the long term vision of a war battered nation in need of political stability and reconstruction.

President Kiir is employing all the levers of state power to ensure he remains in office while Machar does not see a realistic chance of becoming president under the current arrangement. A peace deal signed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia — under threat of UN sanctions for both sides — in August 2015 brought back Machar and his rebels to Juba where he resumed his former position as First Vice President.

The most recent flare up in which 300 people have so far lost their lives is a demonstration that some are not happy with the provisions of the deal and accusations of insincerity have been flying left, right and centre.

In terms of the political architecture, South Sudan’s leaders have much to learn from Kenya, which completely reformed its political system from the single party dictatorial regime of the 60s, 70s, 80s and 90s to a more democratic pluralistic system. Whereas the president remains head of state and government, much of his power has been distributed to other institutions such as the Senate, National Assembly, the Judiciary, county governments and a plethora of commissions.

In RSS, power is centred around the presidency and elections are not seen as free and fair. Political players in the opposition do not believe they have a realistic chance of winning the presidency under the current arrangement. This lack of democratic space is one of the reasons that forced rebels to take up arms in a bid to force a renegotiation of the power balance.

Role of neighbours

Considering the foregoing, it is not enough to merely share power between the government and the rebels. It won’t stop violence from recurring if the political system is not fundamentally changed. Kiir and Machar must lead a process of reconstructing the political architecture in an open and honest environment.

There’s no other way around it. Of particular importance is the emotive issue of elections, who conducts them, the environment in which they are conducted and whether the entire process is perceived to be free and fair. South Sudan must institute wide ranging reforms of its electoral processes as a matter of priority. In the short term, minimum electoral reforms agreed on by all players should be put in place to take care of the next electoral cycle.

The other key factor in the conflict is the role of neighbours, particularly Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya all of whom have more than passing economic and security interests in RSS. All these countries host hundreds of thousands of South Sudan refugees. Following independence in 2011, there was expectation that the refugees would return to help in rebuilding their young nation but the flare up of violence has put paid such hopes, for now. Instead, there has been an inflow of new refugees fleeing from violence and hunger.

Uganda is also worried about rebel activity along their common border because it complicates its own battles with the Joseph Kony-led Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). It is a burden it does not want at a time it is dealing with another volatile border in DRC. At the height of the violence in 2013, Uganda made a military incursion into South Sudan ostensibly to defend its own security interests and protect President Kiir from being deposed by the Machar-led rebels. In the recent outbreak of violence, Ugandan military was among the first to arrive on RSS soil with the stated mission of evacuating its citizens.

Sudan, which the South broke away from after a peaceful referendum in 2011, shares a contentious border with RSS. Abyei, the 10,000 square kilometer region which straddles the border between the north and south, has been a flash point for decades because of its fertile soils, but the stakes rose when oil reserves were discovered in the area. Although currently under UN administration, it remains a highly prized trophy for both countries.

The RSS also transports its oil through oil pipelines located in the north for which Khartoum reaps good revenues. This arrangement could collapse if the 1700km Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (Lapsset) Corridor Project comes to fruition. The project principals expect it to be up and running by 2030.

Lapsset suffered a setback recently when Uganda pulled out in favour of an alternative route through Tanzania but Kenya, which is spearheading its development, said it will soldier on. Can Sudan simply sit back and watch as its revenues are threatened by a massive regional project the scale of Lapsset? That’s an unlikely scenario.

RSS’s immediate neighbours aside, there are also world powers such as China, the US and the European Union who have interest in the country’s natural resources, particularly its oil reserves. These have played a big role in the peace process and have a lot to lose if the current conflict escalates. There is concern, however, that both Kiir and Machar are puppets of more powerful forces keen on controlling the country’s massive extractive sector.

The decisions made by the two sides may therefore not be entirely homegrown but influenced by unseen hands whose overriding interest is not the well-being of the people of South Sudan but the profits they are likely to lose if the political arrangement does not favour them.

- The writer is the chief communications adviser at the Africa Centre for Strategic Futures: Kenya Project.