The Dawn of a Rainbow, The Untold Intrigues of Kenya’s First Coalition Government

Dr Shem Ochuodho recalls how the struggle for a better Kenya began all the way from Independence days leading to the Narc dawn and ‘dream’, which probably never was.The yearning for change had been with Kenyans for a long time. It would appear that the only time Kenyans felt the change that came about was theirs was at independence – when Kenyan sons and daughters fought gallantly to kick out colonialists.It must be remembered, however, that not all Kenyans fought for Uhuru. Some even collaborated with the colonialists to prolong their reign and continue to lord it over Kenyans. Then there were many who were mere spectators, what some would call ‘passengers’.Within this latter group were the ‘doubting Thomases’; they never for a moment believed the mzungu would ever be defeated.Though Uhuru had come through painstaking effort, the new leaders did not jealously protect it.It was only for a few years that Kenyans rejoiced over the victory over the mzungu. The independence Constitution, also christened the Lancaster Constitution after the Lancaster House Conference that brought it forth, was a multiparty Constitution modelled along the British Constitution.&#12288;Kill dissentIt provided for the separation of power, was premised on democracy, and had adequate provision for checks and balances. When Kenya African National Union (Kanu) had a landslide win over Kenya African Democratic Union (Kadu) in the first free General Election, arrangements were quickly crafted to swallow Kadu and form one monolithic party.On the one hand, that cohesion may have been vital at that stage to allow Kenya embark on a serious path to national reconstruction and unification.A similar situation was to play about again in 2002 when the ‘Narc Revolution five’ succeeded in getting Kanu out of power, and later during the botched 2007 General Election.On the other hand, the dissolution of Kadu robbed Kenyans of true democracy, as there was now no organised opposition to keep Kanu on check. In effect, Kenya had become a de facto single-party State.Over time, Kanu started to put in place schemes to kill dissent, both by mutilating the national Constitution and by stifling internal democracy and tolerance within its own ranks. Thus, when dissent started to emerge in the late 1960s with the late Jaramogi Oginga Odinga and others questioning the establishment, it was abundantly clear they would have to look for space elsewhere – outside Kanu.When the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) was formed and it looked like it would rock the Government, it was promptly outlawed in 1969. Later, Kenya was declared a de jure single-party State through constitutional manipulation. The agitation for restoration of multipartyism and true democracy was to preoccupy Kenyans for several decades to come.Thus, whereas the 1992 General Election was fought on the ‘multipartyism’ platform, both the 1997 and 2002 (and indeed 2007) General Elections were fought on the constitutional ‘reform’ platform.Indeed, whereas at independence Kanu set out as its focus three very noble goals of fighting ‘disease, ignorance and poverty’, after 40 years of rule, it could not claim to have decisively conquered any of them.Although some strides were achieved in overall economic development, by and large they were dismal.Kenya would have performed much better under a more progressive leadership.Otherwise, how would one explain that despite relative peace for all the years (thanks to Kanu, though!), Kenya slipped way behind Singapore and Korea in economic growth?In education, for instance, Kanu flatly rejected introducing free primary education, even up to the run-up to the elections of 2002. When Narc strolled into power, within months, one of its first major achievements was to introduce free primary education.When Moi took over in 1978 following the death of the Founding Father, Jomo Kenyatta, there was a lot of optimism among Kenyans.And to give credit where it is due, Wuod Odongo, as the Luos who loved him were later to call him, did a few good things, at least for the first five years of his reign.Perhaps the two-term limit should have long been embedded in the Constitution. One can argue that had Kenyatta and Moi only ruled Kenya for a maximum of two five-year terms each, Kenya would no doubt have been much the better.The second multiparty elections of 1997 saw the rejection of about half of the former Members of Parliament (MPs), and entry of a largely youthful and professional lot of representatives.One interesting trait of most of the new MPs was their ability to mingle freely and engage across party lines. Previously, it was almost anathema for a Kanu MP to be found chatting out an opposition MP.Indeed, a story was told by an official of the British Foreign Office when a group of cross-party MPs from Kenya visited Britain of how they were surprised this lot of legislators could relate so freely, despite coming from the opposite sides of the House.In a similar previous visit, Members of Parliament started to quarrel right from the airport when they were being picked on arrival.Even less warm was the relationship between key civil society reformists of the time and the politicians. This was particularly heightened after perceived betrayal between the pro-reform MPs and the National Constitutional Executive Council (NCEC) leading lights in the run-up to the 1997 General Election.There was clearly a void created with the apparent falling out among the various reform advocates.The only other forum that had previously brought together reformists more than the NCEC was the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford) of the early 1990s.But now, NCEC had been weakened, and the politicians and civil society groups had no time for each other.However, there were important lessons to learn from NCEC and its wider embodiment – the National Constituent Assembly (NCA).The two major shortcomings of NCA/NCEC were the failure to create grassroots structures to entrench the movement amidst the masses, and failure of the two distinct groups (civil society/politicians) to recognise the importance and distinct mandate of each other.As it became clear after the election that Kanu had no intention to mend its governance style, the need for a platform to succeed NCEC was evident, even before the end of 1998, but it appeared the egos of some of the opposition leading lights were so bruised that it had to be the debutant legislators to set the ball rolling.By this time, the National Development Party (NDP) had already made it clear it had no intention to remain on the opposition benches.Unfortunately, the new breed of MPs needed time to learn and know each other.Even more challenging, the major players within civil society hardly knew or recognised them.The Progressive People’s Forum (PPF) was thus a natural emergence.Originally called ‘Progressive Elements Forum (PEF), the group sprung up in early 1999 as a result of common frustration of various reform advocates, and the absence of a credible platform to agitate for reforms.Kenya’s political and economic future was very bleak.Both Government and mainstream opposition politicians and civil society shared blame for the pathetic state, especially of the economy.Basic services were either absent, inadequate or unaffordable to many Kenyans.Unemployment was skyrocketing, with no indication of reversal. Yet, there was no single existing platform that was cohesive, all-embracing and credible enough to agitate for and catalyse meaningful, organised change.Kenya was at a crossroads. The wind for change – political reform in general and constitutional reform in particular – had rent the air.Constitutional change was in the psyche of many Kenyans, having been hot on the national agenda for about three years since the run-up to the 1997 elections.Although no clear direction was discernible, political events were moving at such tremendous speed that even the ‘wallflowers’, those sectors that usually watch politics from a strategic distance, were getting sucked into the eye of the storm.The reform crescendo was heightened even more by the emerging unholy courtship between Kanu and NDP, with evidence of an even mightier dictator emerging, emboldened through the swelling support of the latter’s rank and file.Intractable stalemateBut Kenyans’ resolve for a people-driven constitutional order was euphoric and unstoppable.The country was experiencing an intractable stalemate, the main features of which could be summarised as: The incumbent regime had clearly lost its popular mandate to govern, but had instead discovered a new strategy to continue lording it over Kenyans by dividing the reform forces and the wider community along parochial sectarian lines of tribe, religion (Christians vs Muslims, etc), race and other artificial, non-ideological facets.The mainstream opposition was unable to take advantage of the citizens’ demand for change and organise them into a mass social movement for democratic revolution.The near collapse of the economy, itself a perfect breeding ground for social discontent which, if not properly managed and transformed into revolutionary action, could have easily led to anarchy.Some of the most active members of PPF were George Kapten, Enock Magara (both since deceased), Waithaka Mwangi, Jimmy Angwenyi, Shem Ochuodho (Convenor), Moses Muihia (Secretary), Muthusi Kitonga, Joe Donde, Kipruto arap Kirwa (Co-convenor and later Minister of Agriculture), Mukhisa Kituyi (later Minister for Trade and Industry and Interim Chairman of Narc-Kenya).Others were John Katuku, Noah Wekesa, and Beth Mugo (all later to become minister and/or assistant ministers), Jackson Mwalulu and James Magara (both who joined after by-elections).Some of the most active non-parliamentarians were Alfred Gunda (Treasurer), Lucas Mboya (eldest living son of the late flamboyant trade-unionist-turned politician, Tom Mboya), Ezra Opar, Karen Magara (co-convenor), Cecily Mbarire (later to become nominated MP and Assistant Minister), Godriva Odhiambo, Lawrence Nyaguti, Adrian Ouma, Anthony Alexis, Alex Chamwada, David Onunda, Alicen Chelaite (later elected to Parliament and appointed Assistant Minister), Jael Mbogo, Paddy Onyango, Mandara Barisa Badiribu, Innocent Momanyi and Jonathan Omwoyo.Only two parliamentarians, out of their own volition, left PPF: Njeru Kathangu for no obvious reasons and Dr Abdulahi Ali due to increased pressure from the Kanu Government on Northern Frontier MPs.One other member was quietly dropped due to suspected links with the regime. In due course, other members were invited on board, among them Mwangi Githiomi, Wanyiri Kihoro and Philip Gitonga.It was agreed that Kiraitu Murungi (later to become Justice Minister) be invited. However, this happened when an even larger initiative that was to become Narc was in the offing, and the decision was therefore overtaken by events.Leaders murderedIt would appear that a number of members of PPF were targeted by Government, advertently or otherwise, for persecution.Among their numbers were those who were perpetually in court on one or other trumped up charge of political nature.Some even lost their lives in what appeared to be mysterious circumstances. During the funeral prayer service for a former and founding member, Enock Magara, a PPF Co-convenor predicted that before victory could be achieved, as many as ten pro-reform leaders would perish in dubious circumstances.Therefore, when George Kapten died, it was one-down, nine to go. When Magara died, it was two-down, eight to go. When Father John Anthony Kaiser died, it was three-down, seven to go.When Tony Ndilinge, who was an avid PPF member, died it was four-down, six to go. When Rose Barmasai, a fast-rising peace-building and political-star from North Rift, closely associated with Kipruto Kirwa and George Kapten died it was five-down, five to go.As stated in many functions in which PPF was present, this never dampened their resolve to press for reforms.If anything, it hardened them even the more as was evidenced later during ensuing by-elections in South Mugirango and Kilome constituencies and during violent break-ups of Mageuzi rallies by State apparatus or hirelings.Fortunately, Kanu was to be voted out in a mass civil revolt before the number of dead reformers hit ten.Concurrently, progressive Kenyans in Diaspora also coalesced through an electronic network, PPF-Kenya Online, operated and managed by Dr Carey Francis Onyango (later Narc Party Deputy Secretary General) and Rev Mark Matunga, both based in the USA at the time.Cracks in KanuSome of the other active members of this network were: Margaret Wamuhu, Bob Awuor, John Maina, Ken Omolo, Jared Oluoch, Roz Kahumbu, Caleb Omolo, Lenny Akajo and Ken Awuor.The listed members comprised persons of outstanding analytical skills with wide knowledge of sectoral themes and issues, committed to democratic change and of irreproachable integrity.Some of them were later to constitute part of the PPF/NAC think-tank (or Executive Committee).The think-tank was to engage in constant review and analysis of the prevailing economic, political, social, cultural and security situation, create scenarios, and recommend strategic actions that the Forum was to take to realise maximum impact and advance the course of democratisation.It was also to regularly appraise on the unfolding situation and propose a direction to ensure the struggle remained focused and strategic. At the peak of Mageuzi’s, two twin Motions were moved to pass a no confidence vote, firstly in the Government, then in the then Vice President and Leader of Government Business, Prof George Saitoti.Orengo was an active player in both Motions, moving the former; the latter was moved by Mbita MP, Otieno Kajwang’.Perhaps buoyed by Mageuzi’s countrywide publicity and the citizen’s psyche, some members thought the Motions could be major initial steps at weakening and eventually bringing down Kanu through democratic processes.Even though neither of the Motions succeeded, there were some useful lessons. First, ethnicity was still a very strong consideration in Kenya’s politics.Whereas members of the DP (read CKPG) voted almost to a man ‘for’ the Motion against Moi’s government, when it came to the Motion against Prof Saitoti, whom they considered to be ‘one of their own’, most of them (nearly all in the opposition) abstained, and some even voted for him.Second, MPs are generally a very selfish lot. With the then prevailing constitutional order, it was unlikely that MPs could pass a no-confidence vote in a Government, if there was a danger that would translate in their being sent home as well.It was a tall order to expect that the no-confidence Motion would succeed, with the Kenyan MPs being as selfish as they are now generally perceived by the public.Third, initial cracks in the Kanu/NDP started to manifest loudly, especially during the voting on Prof Saitoti, with a number of the NDP MPs (notably the mover, Kajwang’) voting with the opposition, despite their cohabiting with Kanu.The NDP leader, who was then a Cabinet member, conveniently walked out of Parliament before voting started! Looked at another way, it could be a further case of deep ethnic rivalries between two of the most politically active Kenyan Communities: the Luo and the Kikuyu.It is no wonder that the bitterness had to end up in violent physical altercation between Kajwang’ and David Mwenje (since deceased).Charged funeralsThe irony was that people who were supposedly in Government and were expected to support the VP were now voting against him, yet those in the opposition who should have voted against him on principle were now the ones scampering to support him – just to underscore what high premium ethnic sensibilities score in Kenya’s political scene.Indeed, the grapevine had it that even Moi, the President, remained non-committal during the voting just to see particularly how the MPs from Central Province were going to vote.On hindsight, and with the subsequent dropping of Saitoti from the ‘hot-seat’ of Vice-President, and his ultimate replacement with Uhuru Kenyatta as Kanu’s flag bearer in the pending elections, it may have after all been Moi’s pre-plan to have Saitoti floored, thus readily paving way for him to rest him aside.Unfortunately, for various reasons, that was not to be.Finally, the double win for Kanu confirmed that Kenyans could not rely on Parliament for either constitutional reforms or radical leadership change that they were so much yearning for.The defeat of the two Motions actually translated into a win for Kanu, and was seen by some as a ‘sign of renewed confidence’, bolstering and entrenching the otherwise discredited regime even the more.Even as the structured efforts to evolve PPF and Mageuzi were being pursued, there were other events that significantly charted out the course for future opposition unity. Some of these events were planned, for example the various joint opposition rallies, yet others were circumstantial, spontaneous or ad hoc, for example the various politically-charged funerals such as those of the late Father John Kaiser and Enock Magara.One thing that was common in all these is that they lent the opposition unique opportunities to solidify their solidarity, and to bond with other reform-minded groups, especially the civil society and religious groups, not to mention the general public.One of the leading lights of opposition unity initiatives, and PPF in particular, was the late George Kapten, the then Kwanza Member of Parliament. He was an articulate, very principled democrat.He was a nationalist per excellence, and a progressive leader in every sense. Even when his then party found it necessary to flirt with Kanu, he almost single-handedly stood out to openly oppose that move.Indeed, at one point when it occurred to him that uniting the opposition (and the country) wholesale would be difficult, without first targeting a few truly committed leaders and the regions where they enjoyed greatest support, he set out to identify and bring together those ‘pillars’ for latter-day united progressive forces – and then ultimately spread out to include the rest.It was in this light the late George Kapten, the late Rose Barmasai, Kipruto arap Kirwa and this author had imagined an alliance springing from Northern Rift, Southern Nyanza, Western Kenya (especially Bungoma), Central Kenya and Nairobi would be a natural springboard for a united opposition onslaught.It was little wonder that in April 1999, George Kapten, Kirwa and Tabitha Seii (Member of Parliament and later to become Kenya’s Ambassador to South Africa) hosted one of the most successful joint opposition rallies in Sabwani in Kapten’s constituency.Up to that time, this remained one of the best attended rallies ever by opposition MPs, boasting nearly 40 MPs from various opposition parties at the time, mainly the Democratic Party (DP), Ford-Kenya, and elements of what was to become the United Democratic Movement. (UDM).UDM was a splinter group largely from Kanu. At the rally, even the Leader of Official Opposition, Mwai Kibaki who was later to become Kenya’s third President, was not spared by the marauding hirelings who petrol-bombed the dais hosting the opposition leaders.In spite of the violence that was meted out on these opposition leaders, the rally was a milestone. It showed that if well-organised, the opposition still had clout and could mobilise support almost anywhere in the country.Prior to this rally, few would imagine that the opposition could penetrate Rift Valley Province, hitherto presumed to be Kanu’s stronghold.Hired goonsIn between 1999 and 2001, a number of, to-date unexplained, deaths occurred. Curiously, only pro-reform leaders seemed to have fallen victim.Within PPF circles, it was believed that before change could come, no less than ten reformists would miraculously vanish.Political deaths and/or disappearances were not new in Kenya. There are those who believed that the ultimate emasculation was death.That group believed that Kanu would use a stick-and-carrot strategy to contain dissent. If it was realised a critic was emerging, he would first be induced with offers of cash, contracts or property.There are many leaders who benefited greatly in this manner, through irregular allocations of land.If the carrot method failed, then the stick would be used. In this instance, first, economic strangulation would be used.You would be most unfortunate if under any circumstance you had a loan from a public or private but politically correct financial institution. Loans would be prematurely recalled just to embarrass or subdue one to submission. If that failed or was inapplicable, trumped up charges would be preferred against you. At some stage, PPF victims would ‘brag’ about the number of counts they were facing in diverse courts.Some time around 2001, former Githunguri MP, Njehu Gatabaki, boasted the highest number of counts, totalling 16. He was closely followed by David Mwenje (Embakasi) and this author (Rangwe), each with 14 and 12 counts, respectively.The court cases ensured that one was perpetually harassed and tossed between court rooms, and sometimes thrown into prison, leaving them with no time for ‘political mischief’.In exceptional cases, there could also be physical assault, either at the hands of the police, hired goons, or outright robbers in the form of carjackers.In all these incidences, there was a common denominator: the victim was almost always an opposition leading light, rarely a member of the ruling party, a trend observed even after the 2007 elections.In certain cases, unexplained deaths occurred. When the late George Kapten, Enock Magara (South Mugirango), Tony Ndilinge (Kilome), Fr John Kaiser, and Rose Barmasai died, some within PPF and indeed among the general public saw nothing short of political persecution.Nevertheless, the reformists never had their spirits dampened. If anything, they merely hardened the resolve to soldier on. If it meant death, they were prepared to stake it for the sake of their country.Thank God their fears of ‘Ten Going Down’ was not to come true. But we must all owe it to the five who perished (and those who have since died senselessly) along with other Kenyans who variously lost their lives, limbs or property for a worthwhile cause.We cannot afford to forget them. History would judge us harshly. More than anyone else, it is to these fallen heroes and heroines (some of them never to be known) that this book is dedicated.Sad as they were, the funerals of these unresolved deaths were, as expected, highly charged. They lent yet another unique opportunity for the opposition unity to be blended.The funeral of George Kapten had its share of controversy, particularly pitting the pro-reform leaders in Western Kenya against their Kanu-leaning colleagues. Even the run-up to the funeral raised enough public disenchantment against Kanu.At the time, the late Vice President, Kijana Wamalwa, was at variance with Kapten. Ford-Kenya leadership was warming up to a short-lived alliance with Kanu. It was indeed very freshening to note that almost soon after Kapten’s death, the party totally severed links with Kanu.So, after all, George’s demise was not all in vain! Father Kaiser’s death put the Church, a section of which initially was Government-leaning, at direct cross-purposes with it.The funeral of Fr Kaiser in Naivasha was as tense as any. It was not only a rallying point for opposition solidarity, but also for renewing alliances; alliances not only between reformist politicians and the clergy, but also between Kenya-based reformists and those in the Diaspora.The late Magara’s funeral was perhaps the most tense of them all. A Government minister was thoroughly beaten, a mere reflection of the disgust of society against the establishment.The burial of Tony Ndilinge was not as tense, but nonetheless controversial as any other. It signalled some of the earliest indications that Kanu could still hoodwink certain voters, unless watertight strategies were evolved to offer them an unassailable alternative to identify with.Except for Fr Kaiser and Rose Barmasai, the rest of the deaths presented yet another platform to solidify opposition solidarity in a unique way – by-elections.The power of opposition unity of purpose was best exemplified during the ensuing electioneering.Except for the by-election in Kwanza, which was almost exclusively a Ford-Kenya versus Kanu affair, the other two by-elections witnessed the best of what a combined opposition could do and achieve.— Compiled by Isaac OngiriSerialisation continues Sunday.The Dawn of a Rainbow, The Untold Intrigues of Kenya’s First Coalition Government by Dr Shem J Ochuodho is published by Adage Publishing & Information Services. Priced Sh1,500. Copies available at Text Book Centre and Nakumatt Supermarkets.

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