All eyes on president’s Mr fix-it, Dr Fred Matiang’i

Interior CS Fred Matiang’I at a past function. [File, Standard]

There are times when the president has the services of outstanding individuals whose drive is above the rest. Such people shine and become assets because of delivering more than the expected. They stand out either through intellectual prowess or the power of personality, and enjoy overcoming challenges. Found in every country, the ability to handle such subordinates depends on the leader’s level of self-confidence in being in control.

The United States and Kenya provide good examples of hyperactive people, shielding the leaders or being effective instruments of policy delivery. Leaders allow and at times relish, the presence of strong personalities to shine as long as they are political assets.

Occasionally, there are men who take the hit for the presidents. Every president, Richard Nixon’s chief of staff H.R. Haldeman asserted, needed a “son of a bitch” and he was there for Nixon. Such men would be active in the Department of Dirty Tricks (DDT) and operate under the doctrine of “plausible deniability” in which anything in the interests of state goes as long as the president can deny plausibly.

It happened in the 1920s, 1950s, and 1970s. In the 1920s, Presidents Harding and Coolidge relaxed into other activities as they let Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover dominate every ministry with his belief that the business of government was business. Since the economy was thriving, Hoover was elected president on the strength of his performance as commerce secretary, but he turned to be a disaster during the depression.

Same logic

In the 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower pulled the strings in the background using two brothers, John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles. The two effected “pliable deniability” of doing dirty things that the president could deny when caught.

The same logic applied in the 1970s when Henry Kissinger diplomatically towered over the United States and the globe ensuring that the “foolishness” of voters in places like Chile did not jeopardize American interests.Similarly, Kenya has had officers who shone above the others by sheer drive, either protecting the president or just throwing their political weight around. If President Jomo Kenyatta ever had a “Haldeman”, it was his brother in law Peter Mbiyu Koinange, nicknamed “Kissinger”. In public, Koinange was overshadowed by Tom Mboya, the articulate master schemer.

Mboya had his hand everywhere and was a threat to other prima donnas. In contrast, Attorney General Charles Njonjo, nicknamed Sir Charles, the Duke of Kabeteshire, was the effective behind the scenes operator.

Total man

He was “felt” and appeared like the real power during the Kenyatta-Moi transition period. President Daniel arap Moi terminated the impression that Njonjo was the “real president” by subjecting Sir Charles to public ridicule through the “msaliti” enquiry.

The Moi and Mwai Kibaki presidencies had dominant personalities. Moi allowed a few men to appear mysteriously powerful. Nicholas Biwot, the total man, was a quiet political mover and shaker with Njonjo’s aura of being everywhere. While Biwot ended up being Moi’s “Haldeman”, there was also Mark “Bwana Dawa” Too as the unofficial fixer of political deals with access to the top.

All other personalities appeared to play secondary roles to Total Man and Bwana Dawa. Kibaki had a troubled presidency, undermined by his preferred appointees and “buddies”. In public, it was Martha Karua who stood out as Kibaki’s defender while John Michuki became the cleaner of the environment and the matatu industry.

Uhuru has also had a troubled presidency. He has big vision, the Big Four, which lacked a focal point before Fred Matiangi became coordinating super minister. Consummately ruthless, Matiangi can throw weight in pursuit of targeted desires. Uhuru and Fred came to know each other in Parliament when Matiangi headed the SUNY electronic empowerment project.

Since then, Fred pleased Uhuru in various ministries. One of Matiangi’s obstacles to success, however, is dealing with racketeers, incompetence and institutional inertia in strategic offices. These include critical nerve centres that distort the national socio-economic fabric such as land commission offices, legislative avarice, conceptual dislocations in the judicial process, and different levels of turf warfare. Matiangi has Mboya’s domineering characteristics, Too’s delivery magic, and a bit of Karua’s fearlessness. With “unhappy” ministerial colleagues, will he deliver?

Prof Munene teaches History and International Relations at USIU