Reversed roles as bandits turn heat on cops

In the aftermath of the Kapedo massacre where 21 police officers were murdered by Pokot raiders, an officer who survived the attack made comments that raised serious questions about the quality of police training.

“We had just finished securing the burnt vehicle to our lorry so that we could tow it when we were ambushed by the bandits who had surrounded us without our knowledge,”  Eric Mugendi tearfully told ours sister paper, The Standard.
“They sprayed us with bullets. There was nowhere to run and hide from the assailants’ bullets.”

Poor coordination

His account is a pointer to inadequate equipment and command weaknesses, besides police officers probably lacking skills to confront and fight heavily-armed and well-drilled bandits.

It also calls to question the quality of the 15-month police training course (21 months for cadets) under the revised curriculum, and its relevance.

The Kapedo attack was neither unique nor the first where officers have been caught on the back foot. In November 2012, over 40 officers were killed in Suguta Valley in Baragoi while on a mission to recover stolen cattle.

Following the Baragoi attack, an internal investigation headed by former director of reforms Jonathan Kosgei was launched. Apart from establishing that the operation was uncoordinated, ill-planned, the probe found out that most of the officers had no competence in field combat and had not been paid salaries for two months.

Terrain movement

Earlier in the same year, nine officers were killed in Kilelengwani in Tana River County and their guns stolen by attackers who are yet to be brought to book. Similar fatal sporadic attacks are not uncommon, adding to the growing numbers of officers killed by terrorists, bandits, militia and robbers.

More worrying is that in most of these attacks, the commanders are felled, meaning the units quickly crumble in the absence of command and leadership. In the Kapedo massacre for instance, both the sergeant and corporal in charge were shot dead and so far, no evidence has been adduced to show that the besieged officers returned fire.

 George Musamali, a former GSU instructor, said ill-training was not the problem. He blamed the deaths on lack of operational orders, a clear command structure and tactical failures, saying based on his past experience, the officers were properly trained but were let down by poor planning and lethargic leadership.

“It is not a matter of poor training. First of all, there were only two sergeants; yet that was a platoon that should have been headed by an inspector. Clearly, there was no command at all, meaning there was poor planning,” said Musamali.

He explained that when officers are preparing for such an assignment, the operational order must be prepared in advance. This enables commanders and officers to familiarise with the task at hand. Orders will include fighting patrol, recce patrol, rescue patrol and search patrol.

“There was no service support, neither were the officers briefed about terrain movement. They should have been shown the panoramic view of the area and advised properly on the limit of exploitation, that is, the point on the ground beyond which the exploitation of a successful attack should not continue,” observed Musamali.

Security analyst Richard Tuta also thinks training is not the real problem. He argues that even if they were to receive the best training, officers’ work would be hampered by lack of equipment and low morale. Musamali echoed this position, stating that the officers were ill-equipped and that communication with their base was poor.

“Training does not correlate with prevailing circumstances they encounter in an environment. In Kapedo, training was not the problem, but lack of equipment. They had no armoured vehicles; maybe they thought the attackers would come with arrows, spears and stones,” says Tuta.

He adds that police should strive to change in response to the new reality of criminal patterns and psychology. He faults the extension of training duration to 15 months, arguing it does not add any value as long as the Kenya and Administration Police do not invest in equipment.

According to the security expert, deaths could have been avoided had the officers been riding in armed personnel carriers (APCs) and kitted with bulletproof vests and sophisticated weapons, not the regular G3 and AK 47 rifles.

“It is not just training. Hardware is also very important, though even these will not help much if the officers are not motivated. In Kapedo, response was poor and slow,” points out Tuta.

But his view is contested by a former cadet inspector (recently sacked for allegedly questioning some of the training methods employed by the Administration Police) who claims the training methods are wrong and archaic.

“We are only taught to do things right, but not how to do the right things. You can’t use 1972 methods to combat current crimes due to the dynamism of criminal trends in this country. I remain categorical that planning is a vital tool for attaining both internal and external efficiency. These are some of the issues I raised that led to my dismissal from the service in September,” said the former officer.

Fabricated dossiers

A senior officer added that poor morale is to blame, saying morale is at its lowest due to nepotism and a skewed transfer policy that is based on favouritism. He further claimed that National Intelligence Service (NIS) agents were being paid and used to settle scores.

According to the officer, NIS agents allegedly prepare damning reports about targeted officers. The “fabricated” dossiers are then used as the basis for initiating punishment or transfer.

“The intelligence is paid to write false reports against certain officers. They are victimising officers for nothing,” said the officer, citing the case of an OCS who was recently transferred for allegedly collaborating with poachers.

Apparently, officers are also disillusioned because allowances meant for field operations are not reaching deserving officers on the ground.

Another officer said that some instructors have overstayed at the training institutions, making them unresponsive to new ideas and challenges due to lack of exposure. Other trainers, he added, are allergic to change and are fixated on theoretical approaches instead of practical tactics.