e-Citizen no cure for accountability, governance and leadership failures

ICT CEO Stanley Kamanguya chats with Acting CEO KONZA Technopolis John Paul Okwiri and   (ICT) Authority chief manager Business Development and Innovation Konza Technopolis  Josephine Ndambuki at the ICT stand showcasing digital government services during the launch of e-Citizen Services. [David Gichuru, Standard ]

What started as a simple executive fiat on centralization of national revenue collection is turning out to be a major public controversy, raising questions over the motivations behind it. Roping school fee payments into the magical 222222 e-citizen bandwagon seems to be the ultimate deal breaker for its champions.

To put the views advanced in this article into context, I must state that there is no persuasive evidence or logic that the centralized 222222 Pay Bill number will improve accountability or revenue collection for the government. Scratching beyond the surface would suggest there could be other underlying factors behind this arbitrary administrative action.

Having said that, let’s explore legal, administrative and logical facts before the system apologetics pelt stones at me.

Public revenues

Article 209 (1)(2)(3) and (4) of the Constitution sets out possible forms of revenues that either the national or county governments can impose. Probably drawing lessons from the administrative failures or excesses of the Kanu rule, the framers of the Constitution established an unambiguous governance system for the management of public resources.

Specifically, Article 226 (1)(b) sets a mandatory obligation for an Accounting Officer (AO) to be designated for every public entity, national or county. Sub-article (2) assigns accountability of AOs for national government entities to the National Assembly while for county government entities are to the respective county assemblies. Sub-article (3) mandates the Auditor General, an independent constitutional office, to audit the accounts of all public entities, except for her office, within six months after the end of the government fiscal year.

While various other key aspects of the management of public resources a spelt out within Chapter 12 of the Constitution, the chapter requires an Act of Parliament to detail out authority, responsibility and administrative procedures in handling revenues, expenditures and accounts of the government. The Public Finance Management (PFM) Act of 2012, with its accompanying Regulations of 2015, are the legal instruments enacted by Parliament to fulfil this constitutional obligation.

For example, the specific process and responsibilities of an AO of the national or a county government entity are spelt out in Sections 67 or 148 of the Act respectively. As per these legal instruments, the administrative authority about public spending, budgets, revenues and accounts of the specific entity is exclusively vested in the AO. Besides, there cannot be two AOs for a single entity at any point in time.

In Section 75, the Finance CS may designate a receiver or collector of different classes of revenues. In such a scenario, the receiver or collector must prepare quarterly and annual revenue reports that are auditable separately by the Auditor General. Section 78 designates the Kenya Revenue Authority as the collector of taxes imposed by the national government. The same principles apply to each county under the sections of the Act that address administrative procedures for the counties. 

The PFM Act is only subject to the Constitution on the matters it addresses itself. In theory and law, therefore, there are adequate safeguards as to how public finances must be managed. It is therefore curious as to what exactly are the failures that this centralized e-citizen platform seeks to cure.

More importantly, if indeed it is true the individual Pay Bill numbers managed by the duly designated AOs were conduits of plunder, what is so innovative and unique about the 222222 number that it will not be susceptible to the same malady?

Facts

The greatest national pride of the last two decades was the invention of the mobile money payments system that baffled even the most advanced economies. This invention has revolutionized financial inclusion, banking services, savings, spending habits, access to credit, fund-raising and how we pay for basic services like bus fare and groceries from ‘Mama Mboga’.

The tech companies and related service providers have proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the technology is sound and the integrity of their systems beyond reproach, safe for normal risk that would be associated with any business. Private businesses, social groups and citizens move billions through these platforms daily.

The baffling questions then are: how is it possible that Paybills work effectively for everyone else, except the government? How can these innovators faithfully protect the money and business integrity of everyone else except their greatest benefactor and regulator of their businesses? Is it not the same technology and system that this magical 222222 number relies on?

If individual Pay Bill numbers management by government entities didn’t work for them, even this one will not work.

In November 2017, the Treasury was at loggerheads with a private company that had been contracted to collect revenues on its behalf on the e-citizen platform. As it turned out, the firm was milking millions, probably billions from the access fees paid by users. Was this controversy ever resolved? Who are the current proprietors of the enhanced platform? Could this provide insights into the real motives behind the current obsession with the platform?

There have been insinuations that the government has dramatically improved daily revenue collections to close to a billion a day. Technically, these are figures well calculated to deceive and possibly whip public buy-in into the system. A billion collected in a centralized basket does not become more than the same billion collected in separate baskets of individual public entities.

This reduces to an accounting issue as opposed to system efficiency. Also, if indeed individual public entity collections were being interfered with, then a centralized basket is more susceptible to the vice than decentralized systems. Imagine reconciling thousands of small daily payments ranging from student meals at the University Mess to park fees from across the entire country!

Suppose the Mulot techies infiltrate the system targeting these small transactions! Days ago, the system was breached and folks could not access the services on the platform for several hours. For those who doubt this, in the run-up to the 2022 election, I found out that my e-citizen credentials were used to register me in a political party I had nothing to do with.

The long short of it is this: it is a fallacy for anyone to imagine mere digitization can cure process failures and unethical conduct of public officials. As a student and champion of Business Process Re-engineering, I know for a fact we first deal with process failures and people issues before we look for the relevant technological solutions to support new effective process designs.

Jim Collins, in his bestseller ‘Good to Great’, argues two big mediocrities joined together never make one great company. From a meticulous study undertaken over five years of companies that moved from good to great over 15 years, he found unique leadership attributes of the men who were in charge during the transition periods of these companies.

These leaders got the right people on the bus, the wrong people off the bus, and the right people in the right seats and then they figured out where to drive. They looked at the mirror when things went wrong to take responsibility for the failures, but looked out of the window when great results were achieved to assign accolades to their teams. They hated the ‘I’ philosophy with a passion.

That ladies and gentlemen, is how great nations that endure generations are built!