What Kenya needs is not 'nusu mkate' but permanent political settlement

 

When P[resident William Ruto had a conversation with Azimio la Umoja leader Raila Odinga during the funeral service of the late former President Mwai Kibaki. [File, Standar]

It is rather interesting that our media’s term of art for “maandamano” has, in a break from the past, quietly shifted to “anti-government”, and not “opposition”, protests and demonstrations.  This is not just semantics; the subtle naming change may suggest we have finally come of democratic age.

 If we go on like this, with absolutely no ceasefire in sight, we will be watching and living through - and some of us commenting on - “maandamano” every three months until 2024 at least, or 2027.

Indeed, if we are not careful, we get to the sort of tragi-comically cyclical, but never-ending theatre of instability more familiar with our northern and northeastern neighbours, and Central Africa.

No wonder our traditional neighbours are giggling at what one called our “man-eat-man” society!

The sad thing here, as said before, is the real end-game for the everyday Kenyan in this deadly dance between our elite political divide, or divided political elite, is there is no end-game, but there’s always one for the politicians.  We are simply the grass that’s trampled on by the elephants.

And this is the real tragedy in our current moment.  It is true that Azimio has the right to call for and lead peaceful protests and demonstrations.  It is also true that Kenya Kwanza needs time to deliver on its election-winning agenda, in the justifiable belief that this agenda won the election.

Yet, peaceful protest and demonstration does not equal violence and looting.  And neither does democratic policing and law enforcement equal beating and shooting, and all manner of arrests.

Let’s not go to the “goonery” of who really did the violence and looting, or beating and shooting.  Or goggle at official praise for our “native policing” despite billions of shillings invested in reform.

Instead, let’s remember that we have heard all manner of reasons for “maandamano”,  Cost of living.  High taxes (Finance Act). Open the Servers. IEBC composition (for boundaries review in 2024 and next election in 2027). Multiparty democracy and the political abracadabra of defections.

Then all that jazz about dialogue - “talks before talks”, “parliamentary talks”, “extra-parliamentary talks” which ended up with a bipartisan Parliamentary group that is now either dead or dying.

Fast forward to today. President Ruto and his Kenya Kwanza brigade’s populist simplification of “maandamano” as “a Raila Odinga problem” is already pointing us to the political and economic legacy they might be building in the eyes of Kenyans.  Here’s three thoughts on how and why.

First, that President Ruto won the 2022 election is a matter of official record.  But this was no blowout, it was a shootout.  Even with 7,176,141 votes, the winning margin over Raila was – at 1.64 per cent (233,211 votes) – the smallest in our electoral history, and he was 0.49 per cent (69,643 votes) above the 50 per cent plus one winning threshold when we had 113,614 spoilt votes.

The election is over, but there is perspective to the numbers.  14 million Kenyans voted, eight million registered but didn’t vote, and another eight million didn’t bother to register to vote. 

Ruto’s Kenya Kwanza must see that their daily accountability is to 30+ million adults (eligible voters) and 20+ million children, not seven million adult voters.  Their foolishly exclusionary language of “shareholding” is one matchstick that has lit today’s fireplace of public disaffection.

Let’s also remember that, in an election as close as this last one, there is logic in Azimio (and its 6,943,930 voters) seeking “closure” whether this is by “opening the servers” or a forensic audit. Recall that Raila won the majority vote in 27 out of 47 counties (in areas accounting for 63 per cent of the economy), or five of our eight former provinces and six of our nine “political” regions.

But this is not about Raila/Azimio or any arguments about sharing power.  The statistics are a pointer but not the point.  The real point being that the true Ruto/Kenya Kwanza political legacy must be about a more united than divided nation, especially after an election that split the country. 

Of course, a leadership style recently characterised as “rough, insulting, arrogant and imposing” would have the equal effect of uniting Kenyans against, not for, them, and maybe already has.

The second angle also has nothing to do with Azimio, and is all of Kenya Kwanza’s making.  It’s called “making promises and then struggling”.  Lest we forget, the manifesto told us to measure them against “bringing down the cost of living, eradicating hunger, creating jobs, expanding the tax revenue base and improving our foreign exchange balance…and inclusive growth”.

But this is Kenya Kwanza, people!  So, in typical promissory mode and not being satisfied with only six targets on their backs, their most recent official document – the 2023 Budget Statement – added two more: incentivising investment and production, and enhancing social security.

These are great target statements for two reasons.  First, we can put numbers to them in ways that the everyday hustler understands, like the price of maizemeal.  Second, we can translate them into local language, like “bei ya unga”.  Remember too that cost of living is today’s issue; tomorrow’s will be jobs and next year’s might be hunger if the food agenda remains as confused as it is now.

Although it’s more complex and detailed (sectors, value chains etc), we may conclude that Kenya Kwanza’s “bottom-up economic transformation agenda” (BETA) rests on these eight targets. 

Except that the everyday hustler is not interested in “baselines and targets” that are “prioritised and sequenced” for the “short-term versus long-term”, when all we remember is the President’s promise to deliver results for Kenyans immediately the Bible was laid down at inauguration.

Of course, a different question might be if lowering the cost of living is a realistic promise.  But realism is not part of the Kenya Kwanza playbook, with an endless flow of fresh promises made in event after event in an economic environment where everybody and their aunty suspects it might get worse before it gets better.   It doesn’t help that the economic plan – BETA – is still a state secret (in comparison, NARC’s and Jubilee’s agendas had long publicised their plans by now).

 Let’s just say that we may have trouble understanding the Ruto/Kenya Kwanza legacy because we’re struggling to differentiate between past promises and new promises while feeling the impacts of work from previous governments against this government and what this all means!

Which is not to say that there is no plan, at least on paper. I suspect it’s stuck in an internal battle of wits between the economics of radical policy experimentation (let’s overturn the status quo) and the politics of traditional primitive accumulation (it’s our turn to eat) playing out at a time when we are deep in the throes of economic, fiscal and debt distress.  Try telling that to Kenyans!

It is much easier to blame Raila/Azimio for now and Uhuru/Jubilee for the past and both for everything, but this is a surprising cop-out for a team with past experience of national stalemates.

If we go back to our “nusu mkate” Grand Coalition Government of 2008, and the “handshake” arrangement of 2018, we always remember their “people” components.  In 2008, we had Agenda Four on Long-Term Issues (constitutional, policing, judicial, parliamentary, public service and land reform plus the need to fix poverty, inequity and regional imbalance; unemployment, especially for the youth; national cohesion and unity and transparency, accountability and impunity (including corruption)). We did the first but we didn’t finish the rest.  This is work in progress.

In 2018, we had the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) around nine issues (national ethos; divisive politics; ethnic antagonism and competition; inclusivity; shared prosperity; rights with responsibilities; corruption as a way of life; devolution’s viability and public safety and security).   But we know what happened - through the courts we rather recklessly threw out the bouncing baby of a useful policy agenda with the dirty bathwater of a ham-fisted attempt at constitutional reform.

That there is unfinished work to be done in these “people” areas is not in doubt.  What we forget is that both 2008 and 2018 first involved a political settlement (Agenda Three or “nusu mkate” and the “handshake” respectively).  Sadly, these settlements were temporary, not sustainable.

So, is there a more permanent political settlement (not just for Azimio) that Kenya Kwanza has the imagination to deliver?  Let’s call this President Ruto/Kenya Kwanza’s third legacy test. 

As an ODM leader in 2008, he was one of eight senior politicians who signed off on Agenda Four (for the record: Martha Karua, Sam Ongeri, Mutula Kilonzo Sr and Moses Wetang'ula signed for PNU; Musalia Mudavadi, Sally Kosgei and James Orengo also signed for ODM).  This was after the principals (Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga) agreed on Agenda Three (the political settlement).

The existential question this time is more advanced because we cannot keep doing this every five years. So, do our leaders have the will and the wherewithal to find a political settlement for the long term that also institutionalises our people-led national dialogue into a continuous and inclusive process of reflection and improvement rather than a disruptive event after every election? 

After all the bravado and hubris, this is the ball the people have placed in President Ruto’s court.