Opinion: Kenya’s application of diplomacy is poor

Part of being narrow comes from a sense of entitlement and being tone deaf as demonstrated by Amina’s first press briefing after the loss, where she spoke of “betrayal” by East African countries.PHOTO:COURTESY

The recent defeat of Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed in her bid to become the chairperson of the African Union Commission brought into sharp focus Kenya’s political elite’s lack of diplomatic finesse and inability to craft a regional strategy.

It sounds counter-intuitive that a political elite that is at once worldly and well-educated can still retain an incredibly narrow world outlook.

Part of being narrow comes from a sense of entitlement and being tone deaf as demonstrated by Amina’s first press briefing after the loss, where she spoke of “betrayal” by East African countries.

National Assembly Majority Leader Aden Duale blamed civil society organisations for the loss - as though winning was the Government's birthright.

This sense of entitlement and narrow focus is also because domestically, they have known nothing but cyclic, short-term cloak-and-dagger ethnic politics, rather than long-term geo-strategic planning and execution.

However, this lack of long-term vision is costing Kenya its pre-eminent place as the region’s engine room.

Kenya’s intervention in Somalia, and Tanzania and Uganda pulling out of the Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport project (Lapsset), after they had strung Kenya along, are illustrative of the cost of the political elite’s insular mindset.

While Kenya has always been in the cross-hairs of transnational jihadist attacks, until the Somalia intervention, we were largely a secondary target.

The 1998 Al Qaeda attack on the American embassy targeted Americans and the 2002 Mombasa attack was aimed at the Israelis.

After a series of cross-border attacks targeting tourists and aid workers, Kenya went into Somalia in 2011.

The intervention was meant to be an additional feather in Kenya’s cap, since the country was already the regional economic engine.

From the ad hoc manner in which it was announced, the intervention was presented as a short-term endeavour.

But almost six years later, there is no clarity on the end game, which has only led to the mission metastasising.

Any serious consideration concerning the intervention would suppose that there is a plan to addressing the blow back, especially in view of Kenya's porous borders, structural weaknesses within the security agencies and the complexities of counter-terrorism.

But things have not panned out that way.

Two major attacks, one in El Adde and another in Kulbiyow, resulted in state denials about casualty numbers. As a result, we had to rely on information from Al Shabaab.

Kenya has gained few tangible benefits from its investment in blood and treasure in Somalia.

If anything, Kenya has lost any soft power it had over Somalia affairs.

Nairobi hosted the 30-month marathon negotiations that led to the establishment of the Transitional National Government, the first Somali government after Siad Barre’s exit in 1991, although for a long time it operated from Nairobi rather than Mogadishu.

The political elite’s avaricious appetite for land also led to Tanzania and Uganda pulling out of the Lapsset project.

Knowing they would be compensated if the corridor passed through their land, many rushed to buy land in the area, never mind land in Isiolo is communally owned and therefore many of the residents do not have title deeds.

But the elite acquired titles in a short period.

Sensing that the cost of compensation would be astronomical, at the insistence and lobbying of Total, a major Lapsset player, Tanzania and Uganda pulled out, leaving the rationale for the project up in the air.

Lapsset was meant to be a legacy project that would have linked the often marginalised southern, northern and North Rift regions as well as opened up Ethiopia, with its population of approximately 100 million, to business opportunities for Kenya.

The project would have placed Kenya safely in the driver’s seat via Turkana. And the deal was all but done until the election of President John Magufuli in Tanzania.

Total, seeing an opportunity, convinced him, and Uganda, that the port of Tanga was a better deal than the Lamu port.

All countries look after their own interests; so did Kenya go into Lapsset without a plan B?

Unless Kenya’s political elite outgrows the narrow ethnic politics, Kenya will continue to lose out on the foreign policy front.