Africa forward summit: Less talk shop, more shop talk

President William Ruto receives his French counterpart Emmanuel Macron at State House, Nairobi. [PCS]

In a short break from local politics as a way of life, Kenya is on the world stage this week in two ways.  First, the 2026 France-Africa (not Africa-France?) The Summit was co-hosted by Presidents Macron and Ruto. 

Second, as part of the UN@80 reforms that include relocation of the United Nations’ global headquarters for UNICEF, UN Women and UNFPA from New York to Nairobi, the official groundbreaking ceremony for US%340 million (Sh44 billion) upgrades of the Gigiri complex, at which both President Ruto and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will be present. 

Not enough has been said, even by the Ruto administration itself, about Nairobi’s central role in the UN’s global decentralisation plan. 

The immediate thought that comes to mind is that this move entrenches the impressive standing of our capital city as the Global South’s diplomatic hub (given the other three cities with multiple UN agency headquarters – New York, Geneva and Vienna – are in the Global North).  

Even before we debate its multiple benefits and advantages, from capital investment to jobs, against the expected challenge of, say, real estate inflation or its trickle-down effects for ordinary people, you can already see the “U-Nairobi” diplomatic brand.

Of course, we still need to get much more serious in fixing the entire 165,000-acre plot of land we call Nairobi, beyond Gigiri.  Traffic congestion this week is simply the tip of the iceberg.

But it’s the larger ongoing event we want to briefly explore today.  Themed the Africa Forward Summit, it is the latest version in a long history of France-Africa meetings that began in 1973 at the request of leaders from Niger, Senegal and Cote D’Ivoire who sought what they termed a “new framework for dialogue” with France.

This was the 70s-80s era of "Françafrique" when France institutionalised its mostly economic and security pre-eminence amongst its colonies in mainly West and Central Africa (with North Africa having been “departments and directorates). 

These mostly heads of state summits have survived changing times, from the 1990s of reform, democratisation, and politico-economic conditionality, to globalisation in the first two decades of this century.  Interestingly, the previous summit, held in 2021 in Montpellier, France, was the first that didn’t have a head of state except Macron as the host. 

Seen as a fresh start for France’s relations with Francophone Africa, it took place as a direct dialogue with civil society and diaspora.  This shift aimed to actualise Macron’s long-stated policy intent to end “Françafrique".

Of course, much has happened since 2021, from military coups to more aggressive policy stances, especially on the CFA Franc, amongst former colonies, and it is not difficult to understand portrayals like Reuters last week stating “Stung by West Africa rejections, France courts rest of continent at Kenya summit”.  That’s the “perception as reality” Macron must face and fight.

On the other hand, Ruto must face and fight the perception that he is the new “point man” for Africa’s former colonial masters, with this summit touted as the latest example.  It doesn’t help that his transactional “deal-first” administration is depicted as gaffe-prone on the diplomatic front.

The tragedy is that we miss this administration’s apparent efforts to pivot from “fence-sitting” strategic ambiguity to “look forward, not east or west” geo-strategic entrepreneurialism, in which Kenya is positioning itself as a Global South economic hub. Think of “Nairobi Inc” as the economic brand.

These negative perceptions were not really addressed in the summit’s glitzy rebranding, which is the first to be held in Anglophone Africa.  As a simple case in point, Nairobi’s hosting this year is widely viewed as a Francophone to Anglophone pivot, rather than a strategic “All Africa” shift.

Even less appreciated is that the outputs and outcomes from this summit, to be captured in the Nairobi Declaration, are intended to cement Africa’s position going into the G7 meeting to be held in June, where France currently holds the presidency, and Kenya will attend by invitation.

This position will speak to the summit’s seven thematic areas: reform of the international financial architecture; energy transition and green industrialisation; peace and security; sustainable and value-added agriculture; the blue economy; AI and digital technologies; and resilient health systems and health sovereignty. 

With a deal-making business forum on the first day followed by a heads of state summit on the second, the event seeks to put the private sector at the forefront of a new era of France-Africa partnership while creating a clear action orientation - “from dialogue to delivery” - with political backing.  In one sense, this “bottom-up” approach ensures that ideas and innovations are built from the ground up before they morph into political declarations.

Yet, at the end of the day, Africa needs fewer “talk shops” (conference resolutions) and more “shop talk” (investment and jobs). As we consider whether this summit will deliver, did the Africa Climate Summit deliver? – here a couple of marking schemes for those in attendance.

The first is decidedly qualitative.  Think of strategic value in four ways.  Political value through the rebranding that emerges from the summit’s geopolitical pivot, and agency for Africa as an active influencer, not a passive participant, in the fast-changing global agenda. 

Economic value through the deal-making business forum, resolutions to reform the international financial architecture and sector-specific economic growth possibilities in the blue economy, sustainable agriculture and green industrialisation.

  Social value, through its focus on the youth and innovation, including the creative economy, as well as health sovereignty.  Finally, security value through the strategic autonomy of African-led solutions working alongside mutually beneficial defence partnerships.

The second is unashamedly quantitative and economy-specific.  It so happens at a time when the economy of France was equal in size, at US$3.36 trillion, to Africa’s in 2025, according to IMF data.  In 2026, France will be slightly higher at US$3.6 trillion than Africa’s US$3.56 trillion.

While many, including national leaders at this summit, may be uncomfortable with this sort of economic comparison, which reminds us of the “Africa is a country” trope, it is a useful way to frame this nascent partnership. 

Indeed, when we recast GDP data in purchasing power parity terms, Africa at US$12.52 trillion will be almost thrice France’s US4.73 trillion in 2026 (respective IMF numbers for 2025 were US$11.85 trillion and US$4.53 trillion).  Think about that carefully.

Then step away from mega-numbers.  On a per capita basis in nominal terms, France at US$52,100 in 2026 will sit roughly 25 times Africa’s US$2,350.  In purchasing power parity, the gap falls, with France at US$68,600, about eight times Africa’s US$8,330. 

Here’s the GDP per capita test: how will the summit deliver investment and jobs to converge standard of living outcomes?

Let’s try a different, spatial perspective using land size.  On a per-acre basis in nominal terms, France delivers almost 55 times Africa’s return, US$26,407 against US$474, and is still 21 times more productive in purchasing power parity terms at US$34,696 against US$1,668. 

This is the idea of GDP density, which is closely related to urbanisation.  The basic observation is that Africa’s “spatial context” remains significantly underutilised.  And spatial context here is three-dimensional: horizontal footprint, vertical reach and virtual (digital) space.  So, here’s the GDP per acre test: how will the summit deliver investment and jobs to converge economic intensity?

As we conclude, it is notable, using confirmations at the time of writing, that only 58 per cent –US$2.06 trillion – of Africa’s US$3.56 trillion GDP was expected to attend the summit, with big absentees including South Africa and Ethiopia, both of whom are part of BRICS. So, beyond summits, then links with G7, BRICS or G20, when does Africa reimagine the African Union as an A50 (Africa 50) bloc to better navigate this dependence-independence-interdependence pathway?

As for Africa Forward, what better brand is needed than - Less talk shop, More shop talk!