Sudan guilty of dishonouring treaties, war its strategy

By JOE KIARIE

The fate of the famous 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended a 21-year-old civil war in Sudan now hangs in the balance as war drums get louder.

Amid fears that the half-heartedly implemented pact could now be disregarded altogether, the uncertainty surrounding its execution spells unwelcome news to the East African region, at least if history is anything to go by.

A book by Sudan’s former first vice-president, Abel Alier (pictured right), explains why we all have a reason to worry, and why peaceful co-existence between the Republic of Sudan and South Sudan remains a pipedream.

In his 1990 book, Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, Alier writes that the root cause of the protracted conflict between the then central government and Southern Sudan was that many agreements between them have been deliberately dishonoured.

The book chronicles the history of Sudan’s first major peace agreement, the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. The treaty, which had been brokered by the World Council of Churches and Emperor Haile Selassie, was the first long-term pact to pacify a country that had been at war since 1955. But despite being incorporated in the Constitution of Sudan, persistent violation of the pact saw it hold for just 10 years before the country plunged into a civil war that recorded one of the highest civilian casualties since World War II.

True to Alier’s word, dishonoured agreements, declarations, treaties and testimonials illustrate Sudan’s history.

Border demarcation

Addis Ababa Agreement and several other pre-1990 pacts are now safely in the archives, but history is repeating itself, with the Sudans on the verge of war as yet another historic peace pact — the 2005 CPA — is disregarded.

Apparently, the structure of the agreement was strongly influenced by fear of past dishonored agreements. Attempts to safeguard it and avoid a repetition of earlier violations saw some institutional measures incorporated in the CPA to ensure full implementation.

But key components of the pact, which was negotiated over a two-year period and allowed South Sudan to become an independent country last year, remain unimplemented as deep-seated mistrust between Khartoum and Juba reigns supreme.

While implementation of the Machakos Protocol, the main component of the CPA that led to the South Sudan referendum, was delayed by over one year, conflict experts fear that the obvious breach of a series of other agreements that form the pact will only deepen the crisis in the oil-rich states.

Among the other agreements include the protocol on wealth sharing, the protocol on the resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei States and a permanent ceasefire and security arrangements implementation modality.

The agreement on how to share oil revenue should Southern Sudan opt for independence remains an outstanding issue of the 2005 peace accord, and so is the delicate issue of border demarcation.

Experts nonetheless feel the protocol on Abyei is particularly too critical to ignore. The oil-rich region is regarded as a bridge between Khartoum and Juba and was given special treatment in the CPA due to its sensitive nature and history.

Under the accord, it was granted a provisional special administrative status. Under the interim period, the pact provided for an administrative structure, sharing of the financial resources, determination of the geographical boundaries, specification of who the residents of the area are, security arrangements, the establishment of Abyei Referendum Commission and reconciliation process.

Administrative status

At the end of the interim period, Abyei residents were to cast a separate vote simultaneously with the South Sudan referendum to determine whether Abyei should retain its special administrative status in the north or it should be part of Bahr el Ghazal. But majority of these requirements remain only on paper to date.

Another fundamental protocol that remains in theory is the one on resolution of conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, which were central theatres of the 21-year bloody war.

Under the CPA, the legislatures of the two areas were granted a special dispensation to endorse the CPA or request for its modification through a specified dual process. Each state’s legislature was to establish a Parliamentary Assessment and Evaluation Commission to assess the implementation of the agreement and to report by the fourth year of the CPA. An independent commission was also to be established by the presidency to evaluate the implementation of the CPA in the two states. No much progress has been made on this front though.

Dr Amukowa Anangwe, who lectures Conflict Management and Resolution at the University of Dodoma in Tanzania, admits the implementation of the CPA has stalled, a situation he avers is a well-calculated move by the Khartoum government to continue dominating both the north and south.

Affluent region

In Abyei, he says plans to hold a referendum were scuttled by the Sudan government, which he opines could not afford to lose its grip on the disputed yet affluent region that both states claim, but which South Sudan troops took control of last week.

"When it became apparent that Abyei will hold a referendum in 2008, Khartoum developed cold feet and instigated a war strategy. Fighting in the area led to many deaths and depopulation, with over 50, 000 native Ngok Dinkas pushed out of Abyei in 2008 alone," states Anangwe.

On conflict resolution in Southern Kordofan And Blue Nile states, which are pro-Sudanese People Liberation Movement, he says Sudan has frustrated the peace process same way it has done in Abyei.

"The structures to allow the stipulations of the CPA were never put in place and planned a plebiscite by the residents never took place," explains Anangwe, a former Cabinet minister with vast working experience in Sudan.

According to Anangwe, Sudan has demonstrated gross insincerity in the implementation of the CPA.

"The stumbling block in all this has been Khartoum, which has scuttled all peace efforts. It is all about lack of sincerity in the Arab north, which still believes South Sudan is supposed to offer slave labour as had been the case for decades before independence," he avers.

Violence cycle

Anangwe says the bad relationship between the two is historical and states that Sudan has a well-documented track record of dishonoring negotiated agreements. He warns that selective implementation of an agreement is at times more dangerous than complete abrogation.

Jimmy Mulla, president and co-founder of the Voices for Sudan, admits that the 2005 CPA is fast joining the long list of dishonoured past agreements. He accuses political establishments in Khartoum of using political, economic, diplomatic tactics as well as military force to undermine agreement after agreement,