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How Raila's bid will reconfigure politics and fate of the Opposition

Raila's political journey has been delineated by three distinct phases. Initially, he honed his skills in socialist-oriented ideology and politics during his student years in East Germany from 1962 to 1970.

Upon returning to Kenya and following a brief stint in public service and academia at the University of Nairobi, Raila embraced a second phase characterised by his role as a radical political activist, vehemently opposing Moi's authoritarian regime, which led to his detention without trial for approximately eight years.

During this period, Raila emerged as a pivotal figure in Kenya's opposition politics, advocating with others for the country's transition to multi-party democracy. He also became the face of the campaign for the 2010 Constitution, notably during the Bomas negotiations.

As a Member of Parliament, he consistently mobilised demonstrators to support civil society and faith-based people-driven constitution-making actors such as the National Convention Assembly/National Convention Executive Council (NCA/NCEC).

Following the 1997 General Election, Raila adopted a third approach, forging rapprochement through his National Development Party (NDP) with former arch-rival President Moi. This marked the beginning of a series of cooperative relationships with President Kibaki (2008-2012), President Kenyatta (2019-2022), and now President Ruto.

Interestingly, despite Raila's propensity for controversial "handshakes" following staunch opposition to incumbent regimes, both the Kenyan media and populace have consistently extended clemency towards him, lauding him as the opposition linchpin, architect of Kenya's reform movement, and champion of devolution.

The celestial alignment appears to favour Raila's bid for the leadership of the AUC, with the Eastern African region's turn now at hand. Raila's timely declaration of candidacy as well as Ruto's swift endorsement may prompt other potential contestants to shy from the ring, especially considering President Kenyatta's withdrawal.

Raila has wasted no time in rallying support, initially within the East African Community (EAC), before extending his efforts to other Eastern African countries and eventually across the entire continent.

Kenya's prior experience holding the Deputy Chairperson position at the AUC, through Erastus Mwencha, coupled with a prospective rotational formula aimed at preventing any single country from monopolising senior AUC positions, impedes support for Raila's candidacy.

Moreover, Ruto's endorsement could pose challenges, as some African leaders harbour reservations about the President's ambitions for continental influence, particularly concerning his climate change advocacy and recent assumption of Africa's institutional reform mandate. Ruto's courting of the West largely outside the AU orbit seems to attract sibling rivalry among some African leaders.

Former President Uhuru Kenyatta. [Mose Sammy, Standard]

Kenyatta may endeavour to initiate a proxy Uhuru-Kalonzo-Karua coalition, aiming to counter the Ruto-Raila formation in 2027. Can this Azimio faction coalesce into a formidable opposition? Only time will provide the answer. Raila's unforeseen upheaval has indeed unsettled Azimio and Kenya's opposition politics.

There is no telling if the political earthquake could also, especially in the short term, ruffle Kenya Kwanza.

Kalonzo is already asserting his claim to leadership within Azimio and positioning himself as the presidential flag bearer for 2027. If Raila has indeed fully aligned himself with Ruto, it is plausible that his supporters will rally behind the new coalition partner going forward, following the principle of reciprocity. Consequently, Kalonzo may find himself abandoned as ODM blazes a new trail.

In such a scenario, Kalonzo would have to decide whether to join Raila in Ruto's Kenya Kwanza coalition or run for the presidency independently. However, the former vice president's chances of success would be slim, given the calculated isolation orchestrated against him.

Is there a necessity to enact the NADCO recommendation to establish an official opposition? My answer is in the negative. The president appears to have effectively neutered the opposition. Who would be a credible occupant of such an office today?

While Raila has pledged to remain active in Kenyan politics even after assuming the AUC position, this assurance may simply be a gesture to placate his supporters. Any interference by the AUC chair in the internal politics of any of the 54 member countries will, once petitioned, predictably provoke a backlash from the AU Summit.

In the event Raila fails to secure the AUC chair, his return to Kenyan politics would be fraught with challenges. Some lawmakers are likely to accuse him of opportunism, potentially diminishing his prospects for success in the 2027 elections if he vied. Speculating further, the possibility of Raila occupying the AUC chair until 2027 and then resigning to contest Kenya's presidency appears remote.

It is my belief that Raila's absence from the political scene will pave the way for a reconfiguration of Kenyan politics, possibly prompting the resurgence of a reformist movement committed to vanquishing tribal identity politics, addressing youth disempowerment, tackling socio-economic underdevelopment in earnest, and upholding the 2010 constitution and devolution. However, if this fails to materialise, the existing disjointed political opposition will limp along until 2027 only to face a decisive defeat in the ensuing ballot.