Why Kenya Kwanza's borrowing differs from Jubilee's debt strategy
Leonard Khafafa
By
Leonard Khafafa
| Nov 18, 2026
In Kenya, it has become something of a political convention for politicians to construct narratives that diminish the achievements and tarnish the reputations of their rivals. While some of these claims may contain a kernel of truth, many are embellishments, selectively presented or repeated with such conviction that public acceptance often precedes any meaningful scrutiny. In politics, it seems, a compelling story can travel considerably further than facts.
Here are two of the more persistent narratives, presented as policy failures or administrative missteps, which do not withstand closer examination. A closer interrogation of the facts reveals a rather different picture, one considerably less hospitable to folklore.
The first contention is that public borrowing under the Kenya Kwanza (KK) administration is as profligate as it was under its Jubilee predecessor. At face value, the comparison appears persuasive. Yet by ignoring how borrowed funds are deployed, it conflates the volume of borrowing with its purpose and economic value, advancing a narrative that casts the current administration as fiscally incompetent.
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There is little dispute that Jubilee borrowed heavily, often at considerable cost and with limited demonstrable returns. Its 2014 US$2 billion Eurobond is instructive. According to the Auditor-General’s reports, more than three-quarters of the proceeds could not be traced to identifiable development projects.
KK, by contrast, has undertaken regular Eurobond buybacks since 2024 to restructure debt falling due from borrowings accumulated between 2014 and 2021. Financing these transactions required issuing new bonds worth US$3.5 billion, which funded two buyback operations. The difference is important. Rather than simply accumulating fresh liabilities, the government has effectively refinanced near-term obligations into longer-dated debt, seeking to ease immediate repayment pressures and extend the maturity profile.
The second contention is that the KK administration has allowed corruption to flourish unchecked. This charge, however, overlooks important distinctions. Corruption has bedevilled Kenya since independence, resisting successive administrations’ attempts to eradicate it. Jubilee’s much-publicised campaign, characterised by high-profile arrests, ultimately proved more theatrical than transformative: considerable noise, little lasting impact.
KK has adopted a different strategy, focusing less on the spectacle of arrests across a public service of more than one million employees and more on dismantling the systems that enable graft. Government payment systems are increasingly cashless, reducing opportunities for rent-seeking.
Public procurement is being brought under e-GP, an electronic platform designed to enhance transparency and accountability. Traffic violations are captured by roadside cameras, with penalties transmitted directly to offenders’ phones for payment through M-Pesa. Other reforms include zero-based budgeting, accrual accounting to expose fake pending bills, and the Treasury Single Account, which consolidates public funds.
Legislatively, the KK administration has introduced two significant reforms: the Government-Owned Enterprises Act and the Conflict of Interest Act. The former seeks to end, among other things, the practice of dispensing sinecures in state corporations to political has-beens as rewards for loyalty. The latter seeks to curb the abuse of public office by prohibiting officials from exploiting their positions, public resources or privileged information for personal, familial or private commercial gain, thereby strengthening accountability and restoring integrity to public service.
These interventions do not, by themselves, eliminate corruption. They nevertheless represent a shift from prosecuting its symptoms to addressing its institutional enablers.