Talks with Shabaab not in our interest

Majority Leader in the National Assembly Aden Duale has opened the door to important discussions about the continued role of Kenya in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

While not discounting the need to reassess Kenya’s regional security priorities, the immediate question is whether the Government should negotiate with Al-Shabaab.

What would be the ramifications of any unilateral negotiations with this terrorist organisation?

And would Al-Shabaab actually agree to any sort of substantive talks without Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) withdrawal from Somalia as well as from AMISOM?

Al-Shabaab is fighting to overthrow the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) based in Mogadishu.

The FGS is propped up by the AMISOM military and police elements.

KDF units assigned to AMISOM report directly to the AMISOM Force Commander and are no longer under the control of Kenya.

KDF also supports allies of FGS in nominally autonomous clan-based entities such as Jubbaland and Puntland.

The Kenyan forces joined AMISOM some nine months after the launch of Operation Linda Nchi in October 2011.

Back then there was a steady campaign of Al-Shabaab terror attacks directed at soft targets in Nairobi and Mombasa.

There were also gun and grenade attacks in Mandera, Garissa, Wajir and in Dadaab refugee camps.

Following the KDF “rehatting” under the AMISOM command and the occupation of Kismayu at the end of September 2012, there has been no diminution in the tempo of Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks.

In fact, the three counties of North Eastern Province have seen the emergence of an Al-Shabaab-instigated insurgency.

The objective of this low-intensity insurgency is to render large swathes of territory along the Somalia border effectively  ungovernable, thereby creating sanctuaries in Kenya from which to prosecute its war against the FGS and its foreign supporters.

Al-Shabaab has extended operations against civilian targets to Westgate in Nairobi as well as to Mpeketoni and Hindi in Lamu County; recent massacres in Mandera and attacks on the Governor’s convoy are designed to further destabilise this most exposed of Kenya’s four front-line counties.

All of these attacks are organised, planned and orchestrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia; there is no evidence that Al-Shabaab elements operating within Kenya have a leadership or command structure separate from that in Somalia itself.

Despite extensive Al Shabaab recruitment in Kenya, it seems obvious that its armed elements in Kenya are operating under the direct command of senior Al-Shabaab leaders in South Central Somalia.

There were tactical reverses in 2014 during Operation Indian Ocean as well as the loss of senior commanders in US airstrikes.

However, the group is successfully carrying out its campaign of terror in all four front-line counties.

There is thus no reason for Al-Shabaab to seriously negotiate with Nairobi and any talks would have to be on its terms.

After its recently released Mpeketoni Documentary, such talks would enhance its position as a strong political and military organisation.

This would enhance its image and attract additional foreign fighters and financial assistance from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula.

Were Kenya to negotiate directly with Al-Shabaab, it would be seen as undercutting the AU, Igad and FGS – including allied clan-based administrations.

All these groups view Al-Shabaab as a terrorist group with links to Al-Qaeda and which is keen to oust the FGS and establish a “caliphate” in the Horn of Africa.

The United States, the UK and the EU would view with alarm any precipitate KDF withdrawal from AMISOM, which would obviously have to precede talks.

It is not in Kenya’s interest to attempt any unilateral ceasefires or concessions from Al -Shabaab.

Kenya has not responded effectively to existential threats emanating from Somalia despite having appropriate security legislation, a professional military and a huge internal security budget.

We must close our border with Somalia, reorganise and redeploy appropriate paramilitary elements of the National Police Service and renegotiate our terms of engagement with AMISOM.

Mr Franklin is Managing Director, Franklin Management Consultant Ltd, a security consulting firm