Is it time to redefine our leadership structure and make it work for us?

President William Ruto during his tour of Kajiado county. [Peterson Githaiga, Standard]

Kenya’s constitutional order may need to confront a difficult but increasingly relevant question: Is the five-year presidential term, renewable once, the best model for long-term development?

Reformists argue that Kenya should consider replacing the current arrangement with a single, non-renewable 10-year presidential term. The argument is not necessarily about giving presidents more power. Rather, it is about giving an elected administration sufficient time to plan, finance and complete major national projects without being consumed by politics of seeking a second term.

Under the current system, a president is elected for five years and may seek re-election once. In practice, however, the first term can be dominated by search for political stability, while the second increasingly becomes shaped by succession politics.

A president who wants to undertake a major infrastructure project may therefore have to contend with an electoral calendar that does not always align with the timeline required to complete the project. Major roads, railways, dams, energy projects, irrigation schemes, hospitals, industrial parks and other national programmes can take years from planning to financing, construction and commissioning.

Proponents of a 10-year single term argue the country should design its constitutional system around the reality that development planning is long-term. A president could govern without campaigning for another term. One of the strongest arguments for a single 10-year term, is that it could fundamentally change the incentives facing the presidency.

A president who knows there is no second term to pursue would have little constitutional incentive to structure government decisions around re-election. Instead, the administration could concentrate on delivering its programme and building institutions capable of sustaining its achievements.

The president would enter State House knowing exactly how long the constitutional mandate lasts and would leave office at the end of that period, regardless of political popularity.

This could reduce the temptation to prioritise politically attractive short-term projects over difficult but transformative long-term investments. Completing projects would become a central measure of performance.

Kenya has witnessed numerous development projects announced with great enthusiasm but delayed by financing challenges, procurement disputes, changes in policy or political transitions.

A 10-year term would provide a larger implementation window.

A government could spend its first years on planning and financing, move into full-scale implementation in the middle of its mandate and spend the final years completing and commissioning projects. Kenyans would have a clearer basis for judging an administration: what did it promise, what did it complete and what did it leave behind? This would shift political debate away from campaign promises and towards measurable delivery.

Infrastructure development rarely conforms to five-year political cycles.

A major road network may take several years to complete. A large water project can require extensive feasibility studies, financing and construction. Energy and irrigation projects often require even longer periods before their full economic benefits are realised.

Proponents argue that a 10-year mandate would allow administrations think beyond the immediate electoral horizon. It could also encourage governments to develop national projects that survive changes in political leadership rather than repeatedly abandoning or redesigning projects initiated by previous administrations.

But 10 years cannot mean 10 years without accountability. The proposal would have to be accompanied by strong constitutional safeguards. A longer presidential term without stronger accountability mechanisms could create serious risks of abuse of power.

For that reason, proponents should support stronger parliamentary oversight, independent institutions, judicial independence, transparent public procurement, robust audit mechanisms and regular disclosure of government performance.

A president serving for 10 years should not have 10 years of unchecked authority. The principle should be longer time to deliver, but stronger mechanisms to account. Parliament and independent institutions would remain critical. A single 10-year presidency should not translate into a dominant Executive.

Parliament would need to retain its constitutional role of legislation, representation and oversight. Independent commissions would need adequate protection from political interference, while the Judiciary would need to remain fully independent.

The media and civil society would equally remain important in scrutinising government performance. In other words, changing the length of the presidential mandate would require strengthening the institutional ecosystem around the presidency.

The biggest argument: no second term.

The proposal becomes particularly compelling because the 10-year period would be non-renewable. A president serving a single term would have no opportunity to seek another presidential mandate. This is important because it addresses one of the principal dangers associated with extending a presidential term.

The reform would not create a president who can remain in office indefinitely. Instead, it would establish a fixed constitutional ceiling: one president, one mandate, ten years, then retirement from the presidency. That could provide both continuity and a clear democratic endpoint.

The people must have the final say. Any proposal to fundamentally change the presidential term would require extensive national debate. It cannot be presented as a partisan project or as an amendment designed around the interests of an incumbent. Kenyans would need to consider the advantages and risks carefully.

Would 10 years provide sufficient time to complete transformative projects? Would a single term reduce electoral manipulation? Would it encourage long-term planning? Would stronger oversight adequately prevent abuse?

These are questions that deserve serious public discussion.

A constitutional amendment should serve the country beyond individual leaders. The strongest case for a 10-year non-renewable presidential term would therefore have to be made on institutional rather than personal grounds. Constitutions should not be amended because of the ambitions of a particular president.

They should be amended when citizens believe the existing system is no longer delivering the best governance outcomes.

If Kenya ultimately concludes that a single, non-renewable 10-year presidency would promote continuity, long-term planning and completion of national development programmes while maintaining democratic accountability, then it is a conversation worth having.

The proposal would represent a fundamental departure from the current five-year renewable model. But perhaps that is precisely why it deserves serious consideration. Kenya does not merely need presidents who can launch projects. It needs a governance system that gives administrations enough time to finish what they start — while ensuring that no president can stay in power beyond a clearly defined constitutional limit.

A single, non-renewable 10-year mandate, coupled with powerful oversight institutions and an unambiguous constitutional exit, could be one possible model for achieving that balance.

-The writer is Wajir North MP