Kenya requires fixed ministries to stop patronage politics, instability

President William Ruto chairs Cabinet meeting at Statehouse.[PCS]

In the ever-shifting sands of Kenyan politics, one constitutional provision stands out as a tool for Executive convenience rather than national stability: Article 132(3) of the 2010 Constitution.

This clause empowers the President to direct, coordinate, and reorganise ministries through Executive Orders, ostensibly for efficiency. But in practice, it has become a gateway for political expediency — rewarding allies, punishing rivals and bloating the bureaucracy at taxpayers’ expense. As a concerned citizen, I argue it’s high time we amend this article to establish “standing ministries” that can’t be tinkered with at will. Of the 14 to 22 ministries allowed under Article 152, at least 20 should be fixed, leaving only two flexible slots. Any additions or major changes? Put it to the people via a referendum requiring over 50 per cent approval from registrable voters. This is essential for meritocracy, continuity and true democracy.

Let’s face facts: Article 132(3) has been abused repeatedly. Under former President Uhuru Kenyatta, Executive Order No. 1 of 2020 attempted to reorganise government structures, including subordinating independent bodies to executive oversight—a move the High Court partially struck down as unconstitutional. Critics saw it as a power grab, centralising authority amid the “Handshake” coalition with Raila Odinga. Fast forward to President William Ruto’s administration: Executive Order No. 1 of 2023 reshuffled ministries to accommodate the Kenya Kwanza alliance, expanding the Cabinet to near its constitutional limit. These changes often coincide with political deals, leading to accusations of cronyism. Appointees lacking expertise in their portfolios—think lawyers heading lands or business moguls in health—undermine professionalism.

The Law Society of Kenya and civil society groups have decried this as patronage politics, where loyalty trumps competence, echoing findings on systemic nepotism in public service. The cost? Instability. Frequent reshuffles disrupt policy implementation, confuse civil servants, and waste resources on rebranding and transitions. Imagine a health ministry merged one year, split the next—how does that help combat pandemics or build universal healthcare?

Kenya’s development agenda, from Vision 2030 to the Big Four, to the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda, suffers when ministries are treated like puzzle pieces in a political game. Fixed ministries would anchor core functions: Finance, Health, Education, Agriculture, ICT and others as permanent entities. Departments and agencies—like the Kenya Revenue Authority under Finance—would be firmly placed, preventing arbitrary shifts that breed inefficiency.

Skeptics might argue this curbs presidential flexibility in a dynamic world. What about emerging issues like climate change or digital economy? That’s why we allow two flexible ministries. But even here, safeguards are key. Requiring public consent for new ones ensures accountability. The Constitution emphasizes sovereignty residing with the people (Article 1), and we’ve successfully used referendums before—like the 2010 adoption itself. A simple majority from registrable citizens (those eligible to vote) would democratize the process, forcing presidents to justify changes with clear reasons. If the public rejects it, tough luck—no new ministry.

This isn’t gridlock; it’s checks and balances. Compare it to the US system, where Congress must approve new departments, providing stability amid crises like post-9/11 Homeland Security creation. Kenya could adopt a hybrid: parliamentary input plus public vote, avoiding the pitfalls of purely executive-driven models in parliamentary systems like the UK, where reshuffles cause notorious instability.

Critics may cry “too rigid” or “costly referendums.” But rigidity is a feature, not a bug, in preventing abuse. Referendums aren’t cheap, but neither is corruption-fueled inefficiency—Kenya loses billions annually to mismanagement. Citizens could mandate digital voting to cut costs and boost participation. Moreover, this reform aligns with devolution’s spirit, decentralising power from State House.

Amending the Constitution isn’t easy—requiring parliamentary approval and a referendum under Articles 255-257. Past efforts like the Okoa Kenya Initiative and the Building Bridges Initiative failed due to procedural flaws and elite infighting. But public demand could drive this: polls show Kenyans weary of political musical chairs. Civil society, opposition, and even reform-minded ruling party members should rally for it.

Article 132(3) as it stands perpetuates a cycle of expediency over excellence. By enshrining standing ministries and mandating public consent for changes, we can foster a professional, stable government focused on people, not patrons. Kenya deserves better than a presidency that plays Jenga with our institutions. Let’s amend now—for merit, continuity, and a brighter future.