Why William Ruto needs professional economic advisors

President William Ruto’s economic advisor David Ndii and national security advisor Monicah Juma during a Cabinet meeting at State House, Nairobi. [File, Standard]

The court decision declaring presidential advisors unconstitutional ignited a spirited debate on the utility of presidential advisors. In support of the decision, a number of commentators advanced two arguments.

First, they argued that the president does not need special advisors, since the public already pays several qualified public servants in the ministries.

Second, they noted that the appointment of the advisors is unconstitutional as it did not follow due process as stipulated in the Constitution. Many thought that the team of advisors should be part of the regular bureaucracy under the Public Service Commission.

Both arguments have serious flaws. The regular bureaucracy cannot provide the kind of advice that the president ought to get from his Council of Economic Advisors.

Bureaucrats are supposed to be impartial and have strong job protections by law. Many can be partial to specific presidents to curry favor, but ultimately, it is true that their security of tenure insulates them from having to tightly buy into any administration’s policy agenda.

Furthermore, by law, public officials are barred from overtly engaging in politics. This would be counter to one of the goals of having a council of economic advisors.

Unlike the regular bureaucracy, the Council of Economic Advisors is a slightly different animal in that its members think about both policy and politics.

All presidents need policy advice that is both technically sound and politically feasible. Because feasibility makes or breaks policy implementation, the latter part is particularly important.

And so it is fine for presidents to have a team of competent advisors who are also political animals and can help the president implement his or her agenda with politics in mind. It follows that such advisors necessarily need to sit a little outside of the formal bureaucracy, if only to make them more directly accountable to the president, while also giving them the freedom to operate without the constraints of the Public Service Commission.

That said, there is a case to be made for clearly stipulating the process of appointing advisors, the terms of reference, and mechanisms through which they can be held accountable.

A logical process would involve acknowledging that the president needs an advisor, and cap the number that he or she can appoint. Legislation would also clearly specify how such individuals would be remunerated and for how long they would hold office.

Finally, there should be a requirement for regular (possibly semi-annually) reporting on the state of the economy to a committee of parliament, and answering questions about economic policymaking in the country.

In all this, it would be important to keep the legislation guardrails focused on creating mechanisms of accountability, but without stifling the informational role of advisors. The best thing about the current crop of advisors is that they have managed to make politics part and parcel of the economic policymaking process.

This is invaluable to our political education as a country. No longer are we expected to leave policymaking to nameless mandarins in key ministries – most of whom invariably get captured by special interests or multilateral institutions.

The writer is a professor at Georgetown University