What Kenya could learn from Zambia polls

Zambia's President Hakainde Hichilema casts his ballot at the Kabulonga Boys Secondary School polling station in Lusaka on August 13, 2026. [AFP]

Elections do not end when a winner is announced. In many ways, that is when democracy faces its most important test: what happens when the losing side disputes the result and asks State institutions to prove that the process was credible? That is the question Zambia is confronting after its August 13 election, and it is one Kenya should be asking before 2027.

President-elect Hakainde Hichilema has been declared the winner with 60.49 per cent of valid votes, against Brian Mundubile's 37.87 per cent. Hichilema was sworn in on September 1, but the post-election dispute remains part of the political conversation.

The first lesson for Kenya is that electoral credibility begins long before election day. The EU Election Observation Mission found that Zambia's election was competitive but took place on an uneven playing field, with restrictions on campaigning and advantages associated with incumbency. It also raised concerns about electoral reforms implemented shortly before the polls.

Kenya should take note. Electoral rules should not be a source of uncertainty immediately before an election. Changes to constituencies, electoral procedures or campaign regulations should be transparent, consultative and sufficiently early to allow political parties, voters and election administrators to understand them.

The second lesson is that transparency becomes more important, not less, when something goes wrong. On August 14, the Electoral Commission of Zambia suspended counting and the announcement of results nationwide for six hours after reports of violence against polling staff and allegations of ballot-box theft. The decision may have had legitimate security reasons. But when an electoral commission does not clearly explain why a nationwide suspension is necessary, an information vacuum is created, and rumours quickly fill it.

The EU observation mission subsequently reported serious incidents and procedural irregularities during counting and tabulation that affected transparency and credibility. Kenya should learn the simple lesson: when confidence is under pressure, electoral authorities must provide more information, not less.

The third lesson concerns the most important democratic safety valve: access to justice. Zambia's Constitution gives seven days from the declaration of presidential results to file an election petition. Hichilema was declared winner on August 18, making August 24 the final day. Yet Zambia's courts, including the Constitutional Court, were closed that day, with authorities citing security concerns.

This should make Kenya uncomfortable because our Constitution provides the same seven-day window. Under Article 140, a person may challenge the election of the President-elect within seven days of the declaration of results, while the Supreme Court has 14 days to hear and determine the petition.

Seven days may be necessary to prevent prolonged uncertainty over who governs. But it is an extraordinarily short period in which to investigate a national election, obtain polling-station evidence, identify discrepancies, secure affidavits and witnesses, instruct lawyers and prepare a credible petition.

The fourth lesson is about political space and the role of security agencies. Zambia’s post-election period has included the arrest and questioning of opposition figures over alleged national-security offences, including treason allegations involving Mundubile and his running mate, Makebi Zulu. The authorities say the investigations concern national security; the opposition has rejected the allegations.

Kenya must be careful here. Genuine security threats must be investigated. But electoral disputes should not become security matters primarily. When opposition politicians are arrested amid a contested election, the state has an even greater responsibility to demonstrate due process, evidence and judicial independence.

Some may argue that Zambia is not Kenya and that comparisons are misplaced. That is true. The lesson is not that the two countries have identical institutions or political histories. It is that both face the same fundamental democratic question: can an election produce a loser who still has confidence in the institutions of the state? That question should be asked now, while Kenya still has time to prepare.

Mo Ibrahim's warning to Hichilema captures the broader principle. Elections are a key test of democracy, but the test extends beyond the ballot box. A strong electoral mandate gives a president authority to govern; it does not give the winner a mandate to weaken institutions that constrain power.

Zambia's experience should therefore not make Kenya feel superior. It should make us prepared. Before 2027, the IEBC must strengthen transparency around results, communicate clearly when problems arise, and ensure that the public can follow the chain from the polling station to the national tally. The Judiciary must be ready and accessible when disputes arise. Security agencies must remain neutral, and political opponents able to challenge results peacefully and safely.

Kenya cannot prevent every disagreement after an election. It can, however, ensure that disagreement has somewhere credible to go.