Adverse implications for Kenyan troops under Amisom in Somalia

By Amukowa Anangwe

The decision by Kenyan Government to change tack in Somalia by enjoining its troops in the wobbling AU Mission in Somalia (Amisom) may terminate by default the ‘Operation Linda Nchi’ without achieving the important goal to defeat Al Shabaab and to assure Kenyans that the threat is no more.

One major consequence for the Kenyan troops when they join Amison is the loss of operational autonomy to fight the immediate threat of Al Shabaab militia. They will also have to embrace broader UN-mandated peace-keeping goals in Somalia. Whether or not this decision has been motivated by the escalating cost of the war effort, the fact remains the efficiency and speed with which the Kenya Defence Forces have proceeded so far will now be compromised, as they get bogged down in typical UN-backed peace-keeping missions that have restrictive mandates, and a command and control structure whose traditional hallmark is inertia, indecision and foot-ragging.

For those unfamiliar with UN-backed peace-keeping missions, it is important to highlight their rationale, operational arrangements, their track record and the implications for the Kenyan troops in Somalia. Started after Second World War to replace the previous collective security arrangements under the previous League of Nations, UN peace-keeping missions have evolved in recent years to acquire a special character since the end of the Cold War and with the adoption by the UN Security Council of the Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ on May 23, 1993.

In defining the scope of peace-keeping operations, the Security Council directed, inter alia, they should be conducted in accordance with operational principles of the UN Charter provisions, including a clear political goal with a precise mandate that is subject to review and change in character or duration, as well as the consent of the host Government, and, where appropriate, other parties concerned.

By their nature, peace-keeping operations are debarred from taking initiatives in the use of armed force, except as a last resort, and, thus, they are usually lightly armed since they are supposed to create an environment in which a peaceful solution is found to a violent conflict, or to underpin the carrying out of mediatory solutions.

Amisom is a UN-backed peace-keeping mission with a mandate that has been defined by the Security Council under a series of resolutions, the latest being Resolution 2010 (2011) of September 30, 2011. Specifically the Amisom’s mandate is to conduct peace support operations in Somalia, as well as to stabilise the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the UN peace keepers. The mission’s specific objectives include the protection of the Transitional Federal Government, facilitation of humanitarian operations, implementation of the Somalia’s National Security Stabilisation Programme and support to dialogue and reconciliation amongst the key stakeholders.

Several implications will arise when Kenyan contingent joins the Amisom. Firstly, the original goal that drove Kenyan troops into Somalia in the first place will be displaced by that of the Amisom mandate. That implies, the emphasis for Kenyan troops will shift away from the initial goal to crush the Al Shabaab to that of peace-keepers in order to innocuously underpin a tedious peace process that has eluded Somalia for decades.

Secondly, Al Shabaab may regroup and continue to pose a threat as it has done previously in spite of the deployment of Amisom troops since March 2007. It is a fact, that Kenya’s intervention in Somalia, outside the Amisom framework with better firepower than Amisom troops, has made a fundamental difference that has now driven the Al Shabaab under siege. This military advantage may change adversely, as the bulk of the military hardware, including the Airforce, will have to be withdrawn since such arsenal is not ordinarily allowed under the scope of UN-mandated peace keeping operations.

The general policy of such missions has been to use light weaponry and only in self defence. Thus, the capacity of the Kenya troops to wage war on Al Shabaab as it has been able to do so far will be curtailed severely to the detriment of Kenyan troops in Somalia.

Thirdly, the war effort to pursue Kenyan-specific security interests will be undermined, as Kenyan troops will come under a unified command and control structure led by the Ugandan, Major-General Fred Mugisha, whose contract is to enforce a UN-backed Amisom mandate that is not specifically about Kenya’s immediate security concerns to secure its border with Somalia.

Fourthly, the Amisom is cash-strapped, and it has limited financial capacity for now to wage any meaningful war on Al Shabaab. That partially explains why Al Shabaab had pinned down Uganda and Burundian troops in Mogadishu for long until recently. There are already issues about funding of Amisom by the United Nations, resulting in the failure to reimburse contingent-owned equipment, to pay allowances for troops and other aspects, as recently elucidated in a communiquÈ of the 298th meeting of AU’s Peace and Security Council of November 17, 2011. The inclusion of Kenyan troops in Amisom may exacerbate the mission’s financial woes, and expose the Kenyan troops to unanticipated operational problems in Somalia.

The best strategic option for Kenya should have been an escalation of the build up of the Kenyan troops in Somalia in order to deal Al Shabaab a decisive and quick defeat, and get the troops out of Somalia at the earliest opportunity.

—The writer teaches Political Science at the University of Dodoma, Tanzania.