President William Ruto will on Monday be leading Kenya’s delegation to the Third Russia- Africa Summit, weeks after efforts by families that have lost relatives to the ongoing war, failed to have audience with him. The summit is slotted for October 28 and 29.
The families made several attempts, including calls through the media during the week, that they were expected to appear before parliament for hearing of a petition filed before it. A joint sitting of the Senate Committee on Defence and Foreign Relations and Labour was held on October 8.
Speaking to The Standard on Friday, families’ spokesman Peter Gitau Kamau said they have sought the president’s ear because officials have been reluctant to give information about the steps the government is taking in its efforts to respond to their quest. The families have sought government help in the repatriation of their relatives who are among hundreds of Kenyans duped into serving in the Russian army in the ongoing war against Ukraine.
He said the government’s own intelligence agency told the country that Russian agents were helped by unscrupulous government officials working with the Russian embassy in Nairobi to run recruitments in the country and that is how their relatives found themselves in war.
The push has been to have some of their concerns tabled at the Russia-Africa Summit in the coming few days.
“We believe the president is the one with the power and right to meet his Russian counterpart and have our voice heard at the summit”, said Kamau.
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“We also want the government to be clear about the fate of Kenyans whose contracts have lapsed but are yet to be released from the service. What is happening about such cases? What are our government’s intentions and plans in regard to repatriation of the fatal cases? And what is the government doing to bring the culpable traffickers to book? Can the government officials responsible be named?”
The Kenyan delegation started to leave the country Friday while the president is slotted to complete the departure late Monday, sources at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said. Officials are proceeding to the Moscow summit with little effort in responding to the concerns of the affected families.
The high-powered delegation, which includes Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi and Diaspora Affairs Principal Secretary Roselyn Njogu, goes to Moscow without assuring the families whether their issue will make it on the agenda. The delegation is seeking to strengthen strategic partnerships and advance cooperation in key areas of mutual interest, including trade and investment, economic development, diplomatic training, and cultural cooperation.
“For us, this means pursuing new markets for businesses, stronger economic partnerships and opportunities for young innovators. Kenya’s place on the global stage must translate into real opportunities for our people,” said Prime Cabinet Secretary Musalia Mudavadi after meeting Russian ambassador to Kenya Vsevolod Tkachenko, in his office on October 13.
It is not clear whether the issue bothering the families is likely to feature during engagements at the summit. Kenya’s embassy in Moscow in a letter responding to questions by The Standard, said the matter of Kenyans recruited outside formal legal structures into foreign armed formations remains a central and carefully managed concern of the Government. The welfare, safety and inherent dignity of Kenyans abroad constitute a paramount and non-negotiable priority.
“Kenya continues to engage the Russian Federation through structured diplomatic channels, raising issues related to irregular recruitment, loss of life and the well-being of affected families with firmness, sensitivity and humanitarian vigilance. Our ongoing dialogue seeks to ensure accountability, appropriate support mechanisms and comprehensive protection for all Kenyan nationals involved, recognising the complex vulnerabilities and pressures that may have shaped their circumstances”.
The embassy said their approach is guided by an unwavering commitment to citizen protection, humanitarian responsibility, and the preservation of national dignity, ensuring that no Kenyan is left without representation, recourse, or care. The matters addressed during Mudavadi’s visit in March remain active on the bilateral agenda and are expected to feature in follow-up discussions during the Summit.
“These include the increase in scholarships for Kenyan students to 70 annually. Exploration of professional opportunities for Kenyan youth. Cooperation in the energy sector, including Kenya’s ambition to generate 10,000 MW and interest in Russia’s advanced nuclear expertise. Progress on the Bilateral Air Service Agreement (BASA) to facilitate direct air connectivity. Expansion of Kenya’s export footprint in the Russian market through targeted trade facilitation and product diversification”
The Standard, however, learns that the summits that Moscow has launched for the African continent, named the Russia-Africa summit, have had little benefit to African countries since the inaugural one of 23rd – 24th October 2019 in Sochi. Held in the coastal town on the Black Sea, the summit was co-chaired by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el Sisi, who was then Chairperson of the African Union. The Summit was attended by 45 Heads of State and Government. Kenya was represented by then President Uhuru Kenyatta.
The Second Russia–Africa Summit was held from 27th –28th July 2023 in St. Petersburg. It brought together 17 Heads of State and Government building on the Sochi framework to further expand political, economic and humanitarian cooperation between Africa and Russia. Kenya was represented by then ambassador to Russia Benson Ogutu.
The upcoming summit is the third and brings together the Russian Federation and African countries and will be held in Russia’s capital, Moscow.
A perusal through the World Investment Report has, however, revealed interesting details about promised deals to African countries at the summit that have not been effected on the ground. An assessment of commitments made at the 2019 Summit and their implementation as of 2026 shows that despite Moscow's repeated portrayal of the summit as a platform for delivering substantial economic cooperation and major investment projects, records suggest a considerable gap between political pronouncements and tangible economic outcomes in African countries.
At the inaugural Summit in Sochi in October 2019, agreements reportedly worth approximately $12.5 billion were announced. The figure was widely promoted as evidence of a major breakthrough in Russia's economic engagement with Africa. There is, however, an important distinction $12.5 billion represented the announced value of agreements, memoranda of understanding and other commitments — not actual investment disbursed or projects completed.
In its World Investment Report 2020, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) identified five summit-related agreements of particular significance for foreign direct investment. The five were promised in four countries: Angola, Egypt, Morocco and Rwanda
For Angola Russia promised a project that would protect its telecommunications and information technology infrastructure Avtomatika-Movicel and a $1billion worth urea production facility Uralchem-Grupo Opaia.
Egypt was promised an oil production joint venture worth $ 300 million: EFKO-United Oil. Rwanda engaged in talks about a nuclear science and technology centre. Morocco discussed a $2.2 billion worth oil refinery
Seven years later, according to the report, there is a distinctly less impressive picture. None of the five initiatives can be clearly identified in publicly available documentation as having been delivered on the scale originally envisaged in 2019. Their individual trajectories differ, however, and some cases are more conclusively documented than others.
In Egypt, the Russian food processor EFKO Group and Egypt's United Oil announced plans for a joint venture involving vegetable oils, food ingredients and specialised fats, with proposed investment of approximately $300 million. The broader plans also envisaged additional production facilities and a Mediterranean grain terminal. Although EFKO has maintained commercial activity involving Egypt, what runs is different from what could be seen as implementation of the specific investment package announced in Sochi. Available public records do not establish that planned facilities and grain terminal were completed as originally envisaged.
In Angola, Russian Chemicals manufacturer Uralchem's fertiliser plant offers an illustration of the difference between announcement and implementation.
Uralchem and Angola's Grupo Opaia announced plans to construct a major nitrogen fertiliser complex, with envisaged investment exceeding $1 billion and annual production capacity of approximately 1.3 million tonnes of urea.
The project was initially expected to become operational in 2023. Instead, in June that year, Uralchem's management confirmed that the company had decided to abandon the project.
In Morocco, Russia's state development corporation and investment VEB.RF and the Russian Export Centre concluded a memorandum with Morocco's oil company MYA Energy concerning a refinery with a proposed capacity of up to five million tonnes annually. The Russian side was expected to support financing for equipment and services supplied by Russian companies. However, no publicly verifiable evidence has been identified demonstrating that the refinery was constructed or entered operation under the announced arrangement.
In Rwanda, after the 2019 summit, Russia and Rwanda agreed to establish a Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology in Kigali, thinking of a research reactor of up to 10 MW. The initiative has not been entirely abandoned, but its implementation has been substantially slower than the original announcement might have suggested. As recently as July 2026, Rwanda was still undergoing an International Atomic Energy Agency review of its preparedness to develop a research reactor.
On 29 July 2026, Rwanda and Russia’s State Energy Corporation Rosatom held a joint coordination meeting and discussed further work on nuclear infrastructure, including the research centre. The project remains at the preparatory and institutional-development stage
The five projects highlighted by UNCTAD are not isolated cases. The 2019 summit also produced numerous memoranda covering railways, energy infrastructure, mineral exploration and industrial cooperation. Many of these documents created frameworks for potential future collaboration rather than binding commitments to finance and construct specific projects.
Of the promised projects, the proposed petroleum products pipeline illustrates for the Democratic Republic of Congo how long it will take for an initiative announced by Moscow to be implemented.
Russian financial institutions and the Congolese national oil company, SNPC, were associated with plans for the project. Following subsequent changes to the financing and implementation arrangements, Russia and Congo signed a new intergovernmental agreement in September 2024.
On 30 April 2026, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak announced that design work was expected to begin during the year, with the pipeline now envisaged to enter operation by the end of 2029.
Thus, years after the initial Russia–Africa investment drive, the project was still awaiting the start of design work rather than delivering operational infrastructure.