Why refugee nightmare won't go away easily

In April, Deputy President William Ruto ordered the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to close the Dadaab Refugee Camp within three months. That means some 335,565 Somali refugees will be required to leave Kenya by the end of this month or the Kenya Government will forcibly remove them. This news was jubilantly received by Kenyans.

However, it is important to critically and rationally review the rationale and implications of moving the refugees. A refugee is a person who flees their home; crosses an internationally recognised border to seek protection from persecution (loosely defined as discriminatory treatment) or events seriously disturbing public order.

According to available statistics, there are about 1.6 million refugees in the world, 50 per cent of whom are under the age of 18 years; 49 per cent of these are women. In Kenya, the refugee population stands at about 569,772, with a majority being Somali refugees.

A person becomes a refugee after an evaluation process called the refugee status determination (RSD). This process sieves genuine refugees from non-deserving elements such as combatants and terrorists. Therefore, before a person can be granted refugee status, their refugee claim is thoroughly investigated to ensure that they are genuine.

This means refugee protection is civilian in character and its aim is to protect persons who flee their countries of origin to save their lives.

There has been a lot of talk about refugees, particularly Somali refugees, being a threat to national security. But is there any evidence of this?

The Refugee Consortium of Kenya conducted a study in 2012 that partly looked at security at the Dadaab Refugee Camp. One of the findings was that Somali refugees, particularly those that left Somalia in 2011, escaped forcible recruitment into Al-Shabaab. Further, the report showed that even after escaping into Kenya, some recruiters still followed them into Dadaab. How is this possible? How can Al-Shabaab access the Dadaab camp without detection?

Corruption poses the greatest danger to our national security. This is why arms and combatants make their way from Somalia, past Government checkpoints, into the mainland to attack Kenyans. What are the implications of forcibly sending refugees back to Somalia?

The first and obvious one is that Kenya would be in violation of its national and international obligation to protect refugees. The law dictates that refugees cannot be forcibly taken back to their country of origin where the threat to their lives or physical integrity still exists.

This is the principle of non-refoulement. In the Somalia case, Al-Shabaab is still a real threat for Somali refugees and this could be the reason why many of them are hesitant to return home despite there being a tripartite agreement aimed at voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity.

Secondly, and perhaps not so obvious, is the danger of driving fresh recruits into the hands of Al-Shabaab. Forcibly pushing these refugees into Somalia would first create resentment and secondly foment desperation. Al-Shabaab would be keen to use these two ingredients to recruit this population into its ranks.

Third, and most important, it would divert attention from the real issues affecting our security system: corruption and complacency. Kenyans know only too well that billions of shillings have been diverted from public coffers for private gain. This includes security-related contracts. Before the Garissa attack, there was a huge public outcry over the level of corruption in the Internal Security docket (as it was then).

Another monster is complacency within the security structure in Kenya. How often have we heard that intelligence reports of an attack here or there was available yet nothing was done to prevent it? How often have we been regaled with blame-games following terrorist attacks and nothing seem to change?

During the Westgate attack, it was the lack of co-ordination that prolonged the siege after Kenya Defence Forces forces shot and killed a Recce Company squad leader, causing the latter to retreat.

Again, lack of co-ordination cost more lives in the Garissa University attack when the Recce Company took more than eight hours to arrive at the scene to conduct a 12-minute operation. It should not be lost on Kenyans that these lapses (I call it complacency) are the major reason why the Government cannot contain the terror menace.

What alternatives are there to forcible repatriation? The first is to officially recognise combating corruption and complacency as a key pillar to the counter-terrorism strategy in Kenya. These are the real challenges plaguing national security in the country. As long as these two exist, Kenyans may not know any reprieve from terrorism.

Secondly, the intelligence and operation branches of the security forces should endeavour to isolate and arrest those individuals in the camps recruiting refugees into Al-Shabaab. These are the real culprits and a serious threat to our national security.

Third, the Government should focus more on the voluntary repatriation process already in place. Through it, Somali refugees will peacefully and voluntarily move to Somalia without the risk of bitterness that may drive them into the hands of determined Al-Shabaab operatives.