Few days after the war broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, all eyes turned to Saudi Arabia.
Riyadh cast itself as a mediator seeking to end the fighting and keep it from spreading, insisting that it stood at an equal distance from the two warring sides.
But as the war dragged on and shifted course, the country found itself drawn into the conflict.
According to several reports and analyses, it sided with the Sudanese army and gradually became one of its most prominent financiers.
The major shift in Saudi Arabia’s position from trying to extinguish the Sudanese war to stoking it, has raised several questions about its declared strategy and what that strategy has actually produced on the ground.
When Sudan is linked to Riyadh’s involvement in other Red Sea files, those questions multiply.
The Yemeni case offers another example of positions that tend to aggravate Red Sea problems rather than resolve them, with escalation continuing there for years.
The same pattern extends to Riyadh’s relationship with, and support for, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in its conflict with Ethiopia’s federal government, as well as to Eritrea, which is locked in its own rivalry with Ethiopia.
The net result is that Saudi Arabia appears to be a principal driver of tension in the Red Sea region, by backing the parties that inflame these crises and undermine the security of the Red Sea.
The Declaration of Commitments issued by the SAF and the RSF on May 11, 2023, focused on protecting civilians, refraining from targeting them, and facilitating humanitarian access.
However, the agreements and truces did not withstand mutual violations and the subsequent rounds of negotiations faltered and the mediation failed to turn pledges into a lasting end to the war.
Over time, the question shifted from Riyadh’s ability to bring the two sides together to the nature of its influence and its role in prolonging the war by backing the army.
SAF has been accused of refusing to enter any truce with SAF amid continued Saudi support.
In July 2026, the Global Institute for Strategic Studies (GISS) published a report on an air bridge between Riyadh and Port Sudan, involving executive jets operated by Alpha Star Aviation and Sky Prime Aviation.
According to the report the shipments included three batteries of M777 155mm howitzers, along with ammunition and equipment, and the report referred to training arrangements linked to the use of these weapons.
The United Nations has warned of the dangers of the war and the humanitarian crisis it has caused.
According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 33.7 million people will need humanitarian assistance in 2026 in Sudan.
Sudanese army chief, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has faced accusation of consistently rejecting proposals to end the war, or even to enter a humanitarian truce to get aid to those affected.
He rejected a U.S. proposal for a 90-day ceasefire to be followed by negotiations to end the war in September 2026 and on October when he refused to negotiate and demanded a recapture of territory held by the RSF
