The only way to fight off would-be terrorists

NAIROBI: Terrorist groups take a long time and resources to defeat; they prolong suffering and destruction for years. Countries faced with terrorist groups need to dig in for prolonged engagements.

The transnational character of terrorist groups demands that all countries faced with this problem collaborate and co-operate.

The trend is such that no single state will be able to deal with the problem on its own. Events in Western Europe, Middle East, East Asia, West and Central Africa, North Africa and East Africa are proof.

The onset of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED) has revolutionised the traditional concept of defensive operations, especially positional defence. The use of suicide is not in itself new to operations of war; in World War II Japanese pilots were trained for the suicide missions called “kamikaze”.

Use of tactical vehicles packed with explosives introduced a threat hitherto not envisaged. Such missions give a very short term tactical advantage and are very expensive to sustain.

Although they leave a debilitating psychological effect on the troops, they are not cost effective but for terrorists however, they achieve momentous advantages.

In defensive operations, positions will need reinforcement and a generous use of tactical obstacles such as anti-tank ditches and anti-tank mines.

They will need to be covered by heavier anti-tank guns, artillery, missile units and helicopter gunships and on-call, close air-support. In offensive operations VBIEDs may be expected in ambushes and attacks on logistic formations.

Artillery positions will definitely need protection against VBIED. Booby-trapped VBIED are likely to be left behind by retreating groups and if not avoided will cause serious damage

The world also needs to worry about ABIED (air borne improvised explosive device). Given the difficulty of controlling airspace, a small aircraft packed with explosives, remotely controlled or in the hands of a suicide operative can reach its target without detection. The ability to make drones of all sizes is now common.

The El Adde attack was a turning moment for anti-terrorist operations. AMISOM has been compelled to use larger tactical formations covering a smaller area of operational responsibility (AOR) to enhance force security. Ground has been lost to Al Shabaab.

Combat operations and civil military co-operation efforts have been curtailed. Al Shabaab is now reportedly, busy consolidating and winning back the hearts and minds of the people there.

To regain the status quo, AMISOM will need to recapture and occupy areas taken by Al Shabaab otherwise it will continue to withdraw to its enclaves to fight at a time of its choice.

There is need for preponderance of forces on all fronts, and increased reach by air resources by linking AMISOM to the Air Forces of neighbouring nations and others such as the coalition forces in the Middle East, or giving AMISOM the capacity to operate offensive air support.

The Status of Forces Agreement (Sofa) signed between contributing nations and the UN for troops in UN missions considers very light forces and therefore Sofas for AMISON will need to be renegotiated. There is need to review AMISOM's mandate.

El Adde has taught Kenya and AMISOM very hard lessons for future engagements with Al Shabaab.

Kenya may have to undertake another mission to pacify the Somalia region contingent at the Kenyan border in support of AMISOM, or occupy the region for as long as it will take.

At the moment Al Shabaab is said to be busy refining VBIED tactics. Lessons learnt from El Adde need to be considered in anti-terrorist operations.