How illusion of replaying 2012 script is hurting peace in DRC

One of Africa's deadliest conflicts continues to drag on because Kinshasa is trapped in a dangerous illusion that 2012 can somehow be replayed. While the international community calls for dialogue, Kinshasa remains committed to a military script that has already failed, and is now failing again.

For context, Kinshasa has shown no willingness to make meaningful concessions to the AFC/M23. On paper, agreements have been reached, a ceasefire, a monitoring mechanism, and prisoner exchanges as confidence-building measures. Yet while the rebels have released prisoners and withdrawn from several areas at the request of the US, none of Kinshasa's corresponding commitments have been fulfilled.

Adding to this are the recent and ongoing ground and air offensives targeting the mineral-rich town of Rubaya and the Minembwe highlands. These deliberate military escalations reveal Kinshasa's true intentions: pursuing a military solution while everyone else advocates a political one. The conclusion is difficult to avoid: Kinshasa still sees the barrel of a gun as the only path to resolving this conflict.

Meanwhile, Washington has exerted pressure on Kigali to scale back its defensive measures before the genocidal armed group FDLR has been neutralised. This has only reinforced Kinshasa's most dangerous miscalculation: the belief that once Rwanda steps back, the AFC/M23 will become an easy target.

Emboldened by this assumption, the pro-government coalition, which comprises Burundian troops, foreign mercenaries, and local and foreign militias, has intensified military deployments across both North and South Kivu. The script, as Kinshasa sees it, is that once Washington pressures Rwanda into ending its security cooperation with the rebels, government forces and their allies will advance on all fronts and crush the insurgency. But this script is built on sand.

For one thing, the rebels view this as an existential war. The hate speech directed at Congolese Tutsi, coupled with the genocidal violence inflicted on these communities in North and South Kivu since the conflict began, has cemented a grim conviction: this is a war they cannot afford to lose. In their view, defeat would mean extermination.

Consider Minembwe. There, Twiraneho fighters and their AFC/M23 allies have held their ground for more than a year. This resistance is perhaps the clearest illustration of the asymmetry in motivation: troops tasked with recapturing territory versus fighters driven by the instinct to survive.

On a side note, this particular front also carries the risk of regional escalation. Should the rebels redirect their full efforts toward South Kivu and attempt to push Burundian forces back across the border, the conflict could expand into a wider regional war, with consequences that no country in the region can afford.

For another, the conflict of 2012 was, at its core, a mutiny. The movement consisted of soldiers whose primary objective was to pressure the Kabila government into honouring its commitments under the March 2009 agreement. Lacking both a long-term strategy and meaningful regional backing, withdrawing from Goma under intense international pressure made tactical sense. But it also created internal divisions that ultimately contributed to the movement's collapse.

This time, however, things are different. First, the mindset. Many within the AFC/M23 believe this is the last great war, the final opportunity to secure their rights and guarantee the safety of their people. They are prepared to fight to the end if necessary.

Their determination has been forged by years of persecution, displacement, massacres, and isolation. Second, the method. This belief in a final struggle has produced discipline. The movement has been painstakingly methodical. Internal disagreements were addressed through extensive dialogue processes that began in refugee camps across the region. Recruits undergo strict ideological training designed to foster cohesion and commitment to the movement's objectives.

Third, clarity of purpose. The movement's goals are clearly articulated. They will be achieved through dialogue if the government is willing, and total liberation if it is not. This clarity has made tactical withdrawals easier to accept, even when disappointment among the rank and file was profound. Fighters understand that territory is a means to an end, not an end in itself.

Fourth, and perhaps most revealing, there is mounting evidence of a deliberate effort to build grassroots administration, including justice, policing, education, and other institutions, from the village level up to major urban centres. This is a rebellion seeking to govern liberated territory, not merely occupy it militarily before relinquishing control once negotiations conclude.

As a final blow to Kinshasa's illusions, the rebellion has now announced that it will begin paying monthly salaries to its soldiers, whose numbers continue to grow. This is not the behaviour of a temporary mutiny. It is the hallmark of a long-term political-military project.

The rebels of 2026 are clearly not the mutineers of 2012. They are organised, ideologically driven, and convinced they are fighting for survival. They have built institutions, trained cadres, and prepared for a prolonged struggle. They are not going to disappear under military or diplomatic pressure. Mediators must urgently bring a dose of realism to Kinshasa.

- The author is a Congolese researcher and member of the Congolese Diaspora Civil Society