Does Spain’s exit mark death of Tiki Taka?

Spain vs Russia - Luzhniki Stadium, Moscow, Russia - July 1, 2018 Spain's Andres Iniesta looks dejected after losing the penalty shootout REUTERS

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Hierro’s men failed to ‘press opposition like rats’ in accordance with philosophy’s inventor Cruyff and thus paid the ultimate price.

If the epitaph on the tomb of Tiki Taka as played by Spain was written in Brazil four years ago, then what we witnessed inside Luzhniki Stadium on Sunday, was a commemorative dusting off of the plaque.

Spain’s annihilation four years go was brutal in its execution. In Moscow, there was this sense of hope of a rebirth -false as it later proved the same way it happened at Euro 2016.

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“After you’ve won something, you’re no longer 100 percent, but 90 percent. It’s like a bottle of carbonated water where the cap is removed for a short while. Afterwards there’s a little less gas inside,” so said Johan Cruyff, the man whose coaching philosophy set the foundation of Spain’s watershed period in world football.

How true. For, Spain’s performance was as stale as attempts to bring back to life Mumias Sugar Company. A look at Cruyff’s tenets would suffice.

Central to the Dutchman’s philosophy is the basic concept of dominating the ball, his thinking being: “When you dominate the ball, you move well. You have what the opposition doesn’t, and therefore they can’t score. The person that moves decides where the ball goes, and if you move well, you can change opponents’ pressure into your advantage. The ball goes where you want it.”

Yet the latter day disciples of Cruyff’s philosophy, which has marked Spain’s game in the last decade, have made a mess of it.

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It is easy to find excuses in the sudden departure of Julen Lopetegui, who left the national team job to join Real Madrid.

And so, his replacement Fernando Hierro had a difficult job of harnessing the potential in the squad. In the end, Hierro one of the best Spanish defenders of his era and who was not schooled in Cruyff’s philosophy, ended up with an incoherent system that failed to bring the best out of the squad.

He did admit at the press conference at Luzhniki that he takes full responsibility for his selection and methods.

Tika Taka, in Cruyff’s methods, thrives on 3-4-3 set which he adapted from 4-3-3 which he played under another famed Dutch coach, the late Rinus Michel.

In Russia, Hierro predominantly used 4-2-3-1, which like in the game against their conquerors, changes into 2-4-3-1 in the heat of action.

With most players inherited from previous coaches imbued with different styles, Spain found themselves in a rut.

But this is where the big players needed to rise to the occasion. Instead, the side captained by Real Madrid matador, Sergio Ramos, relied more on brawn than the brain failing to do as Cruyff wanted, “press opposition like rats.”

Also, the decision to go for 4-2-3-1 accommodates a target man (Diego Costa in this case), which does not exist in Cruyff’s 3-4-3 grand scheme.

At the height of their dominance, Spain relied on what respected journalist Sid Lowe called the ‘X-men’ of Spanish football, but who have since departed.

Xavi at Barcelona and Xabi Alonso at Real Madrdid were the cerebral of the team at the height of their powers. Andres Iniesta, too, was the stabilising force.

In fact Sid Lowe once observed: “Xabi’s position is a little more static, a little deeper and his passes travel further.”