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Kenya's big brother role to end decades-long war in DR Congo

The then newly created Organisation of African Unity, for instance, entrusted President Jomo Kenyatta with the task of reconciling Congolese warring factions in 1964 only for imperial powers to sabotage the effort with their military intervention. Planting Joseph Mobutu, who reportedly helped to kill Patrice Lumumba, as their frontman, imperial powers dumped Mobutu once he lost his usefulness in advancing exploitation.

The dumping of Mobutu opened the current phase of the chaos and African peacemaking efforts in Congo. It goes back to the 1994 Rwanda genocide, the escape of the killers into Congo, the alliance of African states that ousted Mobutu and installed Laurent Kabila in Kinshasa, and the subsequent fallout among the allies.

With perceptions of national interests taking over comradely solidarity, Rwanda, Congo, Uganda, and Burundi started trading accusations of looting and sponsoring of militia.

Among the notable militia in Eastern Congo are the anti-Rwanda Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda or FDLR, Islamic State-affiliated anti-Uganda Allied Democratic Forces or ADF, and anti-Burundi government RED-Tabara.

And there is March 23 Movement or M23, challenging Congo's government. Congolese forces, with the help of the United Nations in 2013, defeated M23 which, in November 2013, ended with an amnesty and integration agreement; it was simply a truce.

Among the African states concerned with Congo's instability was Kenya. Its new president, Uhuru Kenyatta, had ambitions to project a Pan-Africanist image and undertake a regional peacemaking role. Reducing instability in Eastern Congo would serve Kenya's growing investment interests and expand trade opportunities. The only African leader at Felix Tshisekedi's inauguration as Congo's president, Uhuru wanted Congo to identify with East Africa.

This was partly because Eastern Congo's imports and exports go through the port of Mombasa and the people in Eastern Congo tend to identify with those in Eastern Africa.

That Congolese identification with East Africa, it seemed, could be achieved if Congo was to join the East African Community. Uhuru then worked hard first to convince Tshisekedi to apply for membership and persuaded other members of the EAC, to accept Congo as a member despite being an Atlantic country.

Despite the heated rivalry among the Great Lakes countries, Congo's membership enhanced the concept of security as an EAC issue rather than Congo alone. When the M23 militia resuscitated itself in November 2021 by attacking and capturing Congolese military bases, the urgency to find solutions increased.

More seriously, however, there were over 100 other militia groups in Congo with an assortment of grievances. EAC was willing to help, including sending peacekeeping forces.

The EAC appointed Uhuru the peace facilitator and Kenya to lead in strategising military action but a few challenges cropped up. First Uhuru organised peace meetings in Nairobi between the Congo government and rebel groups but hit the snag at Tshisekedi objection to M23.

Second, having unsuccessfully campaigned against President William Ruto, there were doubts as to what the future held. Ruto eased the anxiety by requesting Uhuru to continue with his regional peace activities. Third donors' were not enthusiastic about funding fresh peace initiatives.

The challenge of financing operations is particularly acute when it comes to sending the East African Standby Force to Eastern Congo. Since each participating country is expected to bear its own cost, the implementation might be problematic. Kenya, however, appears ready to lead and has sent troops under Major General Jeff Nyagah, who has experience in Somalia, to instil regional stability.