By XN Iraki
Bad leadership has been Africa’s soft underbelly. Most people believe that if only we had good leaders, we would grow our economy, enjoy higher living standards, live longer and be happier.
If this is true and there is overwhelming evidence to support this notion, why do we fail to elect good leaders despite regular polls?
An economic explanation into bad leadership could hopefully spawn a new crop of leaders. George Akerlof, winner of the economics Nobel Prize in 2001 and Joseph Stiglitz, a one-time lecturer at the University of Nairobi, in their ‘analyses of markets with asymmetric information’ shed some light into the economics of bad leadership.
The most sighted work by Akerlof is about the lemon problem. Not the lemon you know, but another term for a low quality or bad car. Akerlof in his 1970 seminal paper noted that “if consumers cannot tell the quality of a product and are willing to pay only an average price for it, then this price is more attractive for sellers who have bad products than to seller who have good products — hence the term adverse selection.
bad ‘lemons’
Consequently, more bad ‘lemons’ will be offered than good ones.The same often applies to market for leaders. In the political market, the consumers (voters) cannot tell the quality of the product (potential MPs, presidential candidate etc), so they are likely to select the bad one.
The problem is that we cannot be sure political players are giving us all the information. Telling too much would be risky to anyone aspiring for a political office at whatever level.
Here comes the other problem. If you go to the car market that Akerlof was referring to, you realise that people selling bad cars, newly painted talk most.
People selling new and relatively well maintained cars do not talk as much. The same applies to political leaders at any level. Those who talk most, usually the ones, who have something to hide, end up being elected as leaders.
We could also argue that the voters or consumers are attracted more by cheap talk than serious talks that focus on matters likely to influence the nation’s long-term prosperity. Please attend a few political campaigns.
Akerlof’s argument suggests good leaders are driven out of the market. And why not, they are likely to find it is too expensive to pursue their political ambitions (like selling a good car among bad cars), in terms of their reputation and even money.
Political leaders know so well that voters would never vote for them if they tell the truth. That is why spin-doctors are hired to write speeches for politicians.
Such speeches ensure masses rarely understand the whole story and information asymmetry persists.
In Africa, information asymmetry is rife because the media was only recently liberalised and some of our cultures are secretive.
How do we resolve the lemon problem?
Chapter Six of our Constitution is a good starting point to espouse Akerlof’s ideas.
However, it is possible that those with political ambitions will ensure as little as possible about them is known, to ensure there is information asymmetry. Adverse selection favours opaque leaders.
Potential leaders have more information about what they will do as compared with the voters.
Few voters bother to follow parliamentary proceedings or attend meetings or read newspapers.
Chapter Six
We therefore need to empower the political consumers (voters) with information.
That is why public vetting and live parliamentary proceedings are a step in the right direction.
The Freedom of Information Act would go long way in ensuring the public (voters) have access to information.
My concern is that we are not curious and rarely seek information unless it’s juicy. Reading is yet to become part of our culture.
We prefer to make decisions based on rumours, hearsays and hunch. That is why it is so easy to stir people to violence using half-truths and plain lies.
Can we redefine leadership as a process of self-actualisation not a means to livelihood? A leader like the late John Michuki was at the highest level of Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs.
Compare him with an MP buying his first car when elected and taking a dinner in a five-star hotel for the first time. Self-actualised people make better leaders.
Kenyan public have never realised that they hold power over their leaders.
They think it is the other way round, perhaps because of our history, where power has always been displayed ostentatiously, from uniformed police, motorcades, and other ceremonies that contribute to adverse selection.
Can we demystify the government to reduce information asymmetry?
We can have a new constitution, but the quality of leaders will be determined at the ballot box. That voting should be based on information about the contestants.
Only then shall we have less lemons and leaders likely to turn faster the reluctant wheel of progress.