Understand terror, then fight it smart

Last week, I attended the first ever Global Countering Violent Extremism Communication Expo in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. The ‘who is who’ in the ‘global war on terror’ were present and eager to showcase their best practices and latest technologies to ‘win’ this war.

Now, not a single terrorist group has been defeated or annihilated since the September 11th attacks in the US. Instead, countless others—more lethal, brutal and dangerous have emerged. Technically speaking, it is impossible to win the ‘war on terror’. Why? There is no such ‘entity’ called terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. It is a method used by armed groups—state or non-state actors, with a political agenda or a cause.

One can, however, ‘stop the use of terror’ in wars and conflicts. To do so, it is important to first understand what terrorism is, and is not.

The word ‘terrorism’ comes from the Latin word terrere meaning ‘to frighten’ or ‘fill with fear’. Resistance movements and insurgents at some point in their struggles used terrorism as one of the tactics to fight for freedom or to terrify populations that do not comply with their demands.

Most African freedom fighters and groups including the African National Congress (ANC), Mau Mau and others were said to have deliberately employed the use of terror. Governments too, do use terror as a tactic to control populations and their subjects. Between March 1793 and July 1794, the French Government employed systematic use of terror on its population as a policy. Four years later, in 1794, the English (British) used systematic terror during the Irish rebellion. Dynamitism (terrorism) was largely used in 1883 to refer to ‘mass-destruction terrorism’ while Germans used Schrecklichkeit (to cause fright) to terrorize non-combatants in Britain.

Apartheid regime in South Africa certainly employed the use of terror as a way of breaking the will of the ANC and black South Africans to fight for independence.

Terrorism is therefore a tactic used by gangs, governments, insurgents, freedom fighters, dictators and psychopaths to achieve certain goals—mostly political.

Terrorism cannot be won. It can only be reduced or its usage stopped as a tactic in wars and conflicts. It is extremely challenging for democracies to quickly address the challenge of terrorism. Dictatorships however can stop or significantly and quickly reduce the use of terror by terrorizing terrorists. But that this can only be a temporary and short-term solution, never a long-term and permanent.

Democracies are sometimes tempted to use brutal methods employed by dictatorships for quick results. But such results are only temporary, and at a grave and prohibitive cost. Such actions end up defiling the very democracy that States wish to protect. Defending democracy calls for a long-term population-centric and largely ideological approach coupled with addressing genuine grievances that exist.

 

Because the ‘currency’ for terrorism is projecting fear to third parties through brutal actions, winning information asymmetries is a first step in succeeding to stopping or reducing terrorism. Terrorism happens when ideological motivation meets operational capability. While it can take years—through radicalisation into violent extremism for one to be convinced ideologically to commit acts of terror, it takes an alarmingly short time to gain operational capability to commit acts of terror. Religion (rather its misuse) is important for groups that use terrorism as a tactic to attain ideological motivation.

The reason why religion is important to these groups is because it is a powerful mobilising tool. Misused, it works as a tool for mass mobilisation and provides motivation, frameworks and justification for the actions of terrorists. Expertly employed (as is the case today), misuse of religion for ideological propaganda though mainly online platforms (and sometimes unwittingly through the mainstream media) on the young and restless population ensures that terrorist groups have the advantage of information asymmetries on their side.

Apart from being the ‘greatest intelligence failure in living memory’, Operation Shock and Awe launched by Americans to depose Saddam Hussein in 2003 produced more terror. It gave birth to Al Qaeda in Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraq in turn produced ISIS. Earlier in 2001, Operation Enduring Freedom launched to take out Taliban in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11 produced mixed results.

Some of these results included toppling of Mullah Omar regime which provided sanctuary to Osama bin Ladin. But it also led to killings of many non-combatants sanitised as ‘collateral damage’. Today, the Taliban, the Afghanistan government and the US are in Doha talking to each other. Why? It is not possible to win the ‘war on terror’ in the battle field.

The Coalition of the Willing through its ‘Shock and Awe’ campaign rendered hitherto stable Middle Eastern countries into a violent mess of violence. ISIS is far worse than Al Qaeda.

Operation Enduring Freedom scattered many fighters around the world, mostly into the Middle East, North Africa, South East Asia and the Horn of Africa. Can we learn from these campaigns? Di they defeated or disperse terrorists?

The government should ensure that the current operational capabilities acquired by terrorists are degraded. But this can only be a short term solution. If we are to, in the long term, reduce and eventually prevent terrorism, it makes sense to pay more attention and focus on preventing ideological motivation that fuels these groups.

Security managers and strategists, as well as policy makers in the government need to fully understand the geostrategic value of the ‘Global War on Terror’ and who it benefits. They should also understand the geopolitics behind, the ideology, the enemy, the goals and the tactics used. Until they do, we might continue to fight the wrong enemy in the wrong war and with wrong tactics. If we are to ‘win’ this war, we must go back to the drawing board.