Answer to security crisis lies in structural changes, not oppressive laws

Kenya is facing unique security challenges aggravated by a dysfunctional legal, administrative and institutional system. Holistic remedial measures to the defective security and administrative system has been equally challenging due to the self interests of the legislature and the executive.

A case in point, which indicates another lost opportunity is the widely publicised security recommendations to President Uhuru Kenyatta by a committee comprising the National Security Council and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Defence.

The proposal to allow the intelligence officers to arrest and detain suspects, undertake what it calls preemptive strikes, tap telephone calls without a court order and keep terror suspects incommunicado will claw back the gains made during the liberation struggle.

The proposals are also aimed at the media to scuttle transparency and accountability in the governance system. Further, the amendment tantamount to legalising rampant extra-judicial killings, will eventually haunt Kenyans on the basis of ethnic and political orientations. Remember the politicisation of the Public Order Act, which was eventually repealed.

The overall impression is that both the Legislature and the Executive have depicted myopic concept of security, which has been further exacerbated by the system of state-centric security architecture.

Vested interests

At both national and county level, the concept of security is highly twisted as shown by the prevailing talk that “in Kenya security belongs to the certain clique within the executive (Office of the President) and people have nothing to do with it”. This sums up a shift of security from the domain of public goods to private ownership.

A fact amply revealed by the absence of ethnic and regional balance in the top echelon of the national security organs and within the membership of the National Security Council (NSC) and the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC). In essence, the two institutions suffer from explicit understanding of security and well thought out objective response, which has created more crises. The recourse was to carry out cosmetic changes by transferring or retiring members of NCS and/or NSAC, in lieu of radical changes reforms.

Similarly, the narrow perception of security has cascaded downward to the county and sub-county levels. The fate of the local security is vested exclusively in the county and sub-county security chiefs who are mainly from outside the counties. This has led to the glaring gaps in the local ownership of security. Hence, when President Uhuru Kenyatta suggested to Kenyans to “play their role in securing the country”, the statement elicited sharp reactions due to its inherent contradictions.

It is, therefore, highly predictable that in confronting the modern day security challenges, Kenya is using outdated security practice, structure and composition that are not in tandem with the reality of the unfolding crisis. Even the solace in the micro-security system a la Nyumba Kumi cannot cure security crisis as long as the macro (national) security architecture is in crisis.

In legal domain, the prevalent insecurity is a function of a flawed laws and regulations governing security and national administration (formerly the provincial administration). These laws comprise the National Government Coordination Act 2013, National Security Council Act 2012, County Government Act 2012, and its corollary regulations. The faulty laws emerged as a result of the politicisation of realigning legal and institutional system in the context of the new constitution. The anti-reform operatives in the Office of the President and members of the tenth Parliament conspired to create bad laws, which were either passed at midnight or by way of omnibus, in a bid to retain the system of provincial administration.

Consequently, the administrative and security laws and regulations have created opaque security committees in the counties that have culminated in dysfunctional relationship between the State and society.

In particular, the National Government Coordination Act and the National Security Council Act together with its respective regulations prevent the local people from participating in the County Security Committee (CSC) and the Sub-County Security Committee (SCSC). The local people and their leadership are prevented from participating in the security committees ostensibly as a measure to protect the “government secret”. However in reality, this measure is instituted to conceal the gross incompetence and bias of the security committee in the delivery of security services.

Absence of local ownership and requisite oversight has turned the security system particularly at the county level, to be a predatory outfit. For example, it is a common knowledge that security belongs to the highest bidder courtesy of corruption.

The influence of corruption has led to biased security delivery in the far-flung counties of West Pokot, Turkana, Mandera, Marsabit, Wajir, Lamu and Tana River. Consequently the security apparatus has been a source of perennial insecurity in Kenya. If not addressed soberly, the spate of conflicts and biased response by the Government will fuel widespread grievances and agitation for self-determination.

It is abundantly clear that the “custodians” of the national and county security are invariably ignorant of the history, geography, social, cultural and local politics; a special determinant in understanding security dynamics and the appropriate response.

Instead, the security knowledge of the national and county security officials are limited to declaring the state of emergency, undertaking lopsided security operations characterised by human rights violations and cheering of a colourful parade during the national celebrations. Hence, the provision of security delivery remains divorced from local needs, context and reality.

Parasitic command system

The security crisis is further aggravated by the conflicts between the national and the county government perpetrated by the competing parallel system of administration. The national administration is a parasitic top-down chain of command system that is aimed to control, oppress and subdue the local people.

Further, each layer of national and county administration has created multiple centre of power. The competing administrative system has been a source of friction, discord, discontent and conflict. For example, the county commissioners are ever in a competing mode with governors, a fact that has been exploited by criminal elements.

Apart from chiefs and assistant chiefs, which is a token gesture, the national administration lacks local component at higher levels in the county. County commissioners, deputy county commissioner (sub-county) and assistant deputy county commissioner are posted by the Office of the President without consultation and concurrence of the local people.

The crisis engendered by the administrators sent from Nairobi is that they lack basic norms and knowledge of the local community. Some of the administrators are often sent to the “harsh” arid and semi arid areas on either poor performance or a disciplinary ground.

In the format established by the National Government Coordination Act 2013, the national administration negates the object of devolution as stipulated in Article 175 of the Constitution which: give powers of self-governance and recognise the right of communities to manage their own affairs. It is now clear that if not phased out or restructured properly to accord with the system of devolved government, the amorphous system of the national administration (provincial administration) at the county level is a threat to the well being of the people and the State.

The solution to insecurity is located in the legal, administrative and institutional reforms to establish people-centred system with local ownership that is able to legitimise and shift the perception of national security organs from predator to protector.